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Abstract
Wepresent a security proof for establishing private entanglement bymeans of recurrence-type
entanglement distillation protocols over noisy quantum channels.We consider protocols where the
local devices are imperfect, and show that nonetheless a confidential quantum channel can be
established, and used to e.g. performdistributed quantum computation in a securemanner.While
our results are not fully device independent (whichwe argue to be unachievable in settings with
quantumoutputs), our proof holds for arbitrary channel noise and noisy local operations, and even in
the casewhere the eavesdropper learns the noise. Our approach relies on non-trivial properties of
distillation protocols which are used in conjunctionwith de-Finetti and post-selection-type
techniques to reduce a general quantumattack in a non-asymptotic scenario to an i.i.d. setting. As a
side result, we also provide entanglement distillation protocols for non-i.i.d. input states.
1. Introduction
Entanglement is a key resource in quantum information processing. Entanglement can be used to teleport
quantum information [1], to implement remote quantumgates [2], or for distributed quantum computation
[3]. It allows one to perform tasks that are not possible by classicalmeans, such as secret key expansion vital for
secure classical communication. The latter is achieved through the famous and extensively studied quantumkey
distribution (QKD) protocols [4–10]. In theseworks, security was proven in a variety of evermore general
scenarios, considering noisy channels, imperfect devices and device-independent (DI) settings, where even the
local quantumdevices are untrusted [11–13].
In contrast, the perhaps equally important task of establishing private entanglement, and the closely related
problemof establishing secure quantum channels, has not been resolved in equal generality. The latter has,
historically, received significantly less attention [14], until the very recent increase of interest [15–18] in security
under ideal settings. The task of establishing private entanglement has been considered in the context of noisy
channels and both perfect [19] operations, and operations with local depolarizing noise [20, 21]. In theseworks,
either initial states that are identical and independently distributed (i.i.d.), or asymptotic scenarios are assumed.
Here, we present a comprehensive treatment for the security of distillation protocols. Tomake our results
broadly applicable, we generalize the securitymodel (i.e. powers of the adversary) over standard settings for
protocols with quantumoutputs. Furthermore, we remove the need for asymptotic, or i.i.d. assumptions, allow
formore general noisemodels, and formulate and prove security criteria which ensure composability—i.e. the
security of the protocols when they are used in arbitrary contexts, e.g. as sub-routines of larger protocols.
More specifically,we consider arbitrary attacks employedby an adversary (Eve, the distributer of noisy or corrupt
Bell-pairs) and assumenoisy communication channels andnoisy local operations—essentially arbitrarynoise
describing imperfect single- and two-qubit gates.Wealso extend adversarial powers beyond standard: thenoisy
apparatusmay leak all the information about thenoise processeswhichoccurred in a runof theprotocol toEve.
Our scenario, by necessity, falls short from full DI, as security under suchweakest assumptions is not
attainable for protocols with a quantumoutput—any device used in any protocol withwhich a client can
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deviate fromhonest behavior when thefinal quantumoutput is eventually demanded (independent of how
elaborate the testingmay have been). This raises the questions of howDI assumptions can be relaxed such that
security becomes possible also for quantumoutput protocols, or how standard securitymodels can be further
extended.
DI assumptions can be understood as an extreme noisy scenario, where Eve has absolute control over the
noise processes. Ourmodel relaxes this: Eve’s control is not exact (deterministic), but rather probabilistic,
however still perfectly heralded—while Evemay fail in her interventions, she still learns the noise realized. In this
sense, generalizing the types of noise the protocol is provably secure under in ourmodel, corresponds to
scenarios which are ever closer toDI.Naturally, other generalizations ofDI settings whichmake sense for
protocols with quantumoutputsmay be possible4.
We proceed by first providing a security analysis for i.i.d. inputs, and then generalize to non-i.i.d. states. This
is done by employing de-Finetti and post-selection symmetrization-based techniques. However, sincewe are
interested in security in arbitrary contexts, wemust go beyond standard scenarios considered in entanglement
distillationworks [19–21] and explicitly consider the adversarial quantum systems (containing e.g. purifications
of all quantum states) aswell. Therefore the symmetrization-based techniques cannot be straightforwardly
applied, but need to be adapted.We present and discuss the required additional steps of preprocessing, and
provide entanglement distillation protocols that are not restricted to i.i.d. inputs, but are capable of dealingwith
general inputs. The latter is related to recent results in [22–24].
2. Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3we introduce the basic concepts, specify the overall setting and
define the confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols. Next, we summarize ourmain contribution in
section 4. In section 5we show confidentiality of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols by proving
confidentiality for i.i.d. inputs in section 5.1 andwe extend this results to arbitrary initial states in sections 5.2
and 5.3. Finally we prove confidentiality whenever the noise transcripts leak to Eve in section 5.4.We summarize
and discuss our results in section 6.
3. Themodel and security guarantees
Entanglement distillation ismodeled by considering three players, Alice and Bob, whowish to generate a shared
Bell pair, and Eve, who provides the initial pairs. Thus, Eve is connected toAlice and to Bob via a (generally
noisy) quantum channel whichmay be completely under her control. Alice and Bob are connected by a classical
authenticated, but not confidential, channel. In entanglement distillation protocols Alice and Bob apply local, in
general noisy, quantumoperations to their pairs. Tomodel this noise, we extend the approach of [20], where a
noise register, referred to as the ‘lab demon’ (L) register L is used to store classical information about the local
noise history, is appended toAlice and Bob’s pairs. In this work, the L register is a quantum register, attached to
Alice and Bob.We represent the noisymaps of the entanglement distillation process as unitaries acting on an
enlargedHilbert space. L thereby coherently applies Pauli operators onto the registers of Alice and Bob.Due to
the symmetry of Bell states B 1 2 00 11 ,00ñ = ñ + ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) it suffices to consider the case when the noise is applied
onAlice’s register only. Tomodel the settingwhere Eve acquires information about the noise transcript during
the execution of the protocol, we assume that L informs Evewhich noise operator was applied at each step. The
setting is illustrated infigure 1. In the remainder of this paperwe elaborate further on the full quantum
treatment of L and Eve in terms of purifications, going beyond the setting of [20].
The proposed overall protocol under i.i.d. assumption involves several steps. First, Eve distributes n pairs
(the initial states), to Alice and Bobwho apply local ‘twirl’ operations (random, correlated local operations).
Next, Alice andBob sacrifice somem n» pairs to checkwhether the fidelity, givenwith
F , tr 1 2 1 2r s r sr=( ) for density operators ρ andσ, of the pairs is sufficient for entanglement distillation, via
local xs and zs measurements. If thefidelity F relative to B00ñ∣ is insufficient, they abort. Otherwise they proceed
with a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol to produce a highfidelity Bell-pair from the
remaining initial states, whichmay also be aborted. Finally, Alice and Bob output their final state. For i.i.d.
inputs, the twirl ensures that local zs and xs correlationmeasurements can be used to estimate the fidelity of
individual pairs. This estimate is crucial for ensuring entanglement distillation via recurrence-type
entanglement distillation protocols. Later, wewill generalize to non-i.i.d. settings by prepending the protocol
with symmetrization (permuting of the pairs) and tracing-out steps.
4
E.g., we assume very primitive, but trusted, quantumdevices, such as a device which can either forward an input quantum system, or
measure it in one basis. Already such a simple device invalidates our no-go observation.
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To formalize the security requirements, we define the idealmap l,a , mapping the initial states of Alice and
Bob to a single Bell-pair, whereα (abstractly) characterizes the noise levels in the channels connecting Eve to
Alice and Bob, and also the noise of the local devices, and l indicates that the noise transcripts leak to Eve. The
idealmap can intuitively be thought of as amapwhich simulates a real protocol as follows. In the case of an
abort, it replaces the final state with a fixed state ABEs^ . In the non-aborting case, however, it replaces the actual
outputwith a special state ,ABE
l, ,sa which corresponds to the output of a real protocol where the noise transcripts
leak to Eve, utilizing distillation protocol  , that was successfully runwith asymptoticallymany high-fidelity
i.i.d. initial pairs. This is the best the noisy entanglement distillation protocol  could ever do. Aswe show later,
ABE
l, ,sa is a well-defined state for the entanglement distillation protocols and noise parameters considered here.
That is, it depends on the local noise parameters only, and not the initial states. Formally, we have for a given real
map (that is, themap realized by the execution of a real protocol)
p pid ok ok 1 fail fail 1l E ABE ABE f ABE f
, y y s sÄ ñá = Ä ñá + - Ä ñáa r r ^( )(∣ ∣ ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣ ( )
a corresponding idealmap
p pid ok ok 1 fail fail , 2l E ABE ABE
l
f ABE f
, , , y y s sÄ ñá = Ä ñá + - Ä ñáa r a r ^( )(∣ ∣ ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣ ( )
where ABEyñ∣ is a purification of the initial n-partite ensemble ABnr( ) provided by Eve, pr is the success probability
depending on the initial state AB
nr( ) , and ABEs^ is a fixed state output if the protocol is aborted. Observe that the
corresponding success probabilities pr, per definition, are identical for the real and idealmaps l,a and l,a in
(1) and (2) respectively. The two-level flag system f distinguishes the accepting and aborting branches. The state
ABE
l, ,sa is the asymptotic state of the entanglement distillation protocol  and is of the form
B B, , 3ABE
l
i j











⎟⎟( )∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
where ijh ñ∣ are the leakednoise transcripts of Eve, B Bidij xj zi 00s sñ = Ä ñ∣ ( )∣ theBell-basis states, and ,ij w a( ) are
probabilitieswhichdependon thenoise level of the local devices and the entanglement distillationprotocol  . For
instance, if the local devices are perfect, then 1ijw = if andonly if i j 0,= = henceAB contains a perfect Bell-pair.
Finally, the states ijh ñ∣ specify the sequences of noise operations, and are orthogonal for different i j, . If the noise
transcripts are not leaked toEve,wedenote the ideal protocol by a. In that case, ijh ñ∣ in (3) is not accessible toEve,
hencewe replace ABE
l, ,sa by B B,ABE i j ij ij ij AB E, , s w a s= å ñá Äa ( ( )∣ ∣ ) in (2). Observe that the idealmap l,a , which
mathematically defines the type of processwewish to realize, is a global operationbeyondLOCC (local operations
and classical communication)which canbedecomposedby concatenating the real protocol l,a and a replacement
map  (which replaces thefinal state only if the real protocol succeeds according to the system f in (2)),
i.e. l l, ,  =a a◦ .
An entanglement distillation protocol (together with the noisemaps), given as a CPTPmap l,a ( ), is
confidential if it is close to the idealmap:
Definition 1.The protocol l,a ( ) is ε-confidential, if
id id 4l E l E ABE, , 1  y y eÄ - Ä ñáa a ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )( ) ( )
holds for all initial states ,ABEyñ∣ where tr1r rr=  † is the operator 1-norm for a density operators ρ.
Figure 1. Illustration of the overall setting: Eve provides the initial pairs toAlice and Bob, who run the entanglement distillation
protocol. The noisy apparatusmay leak the specification of the realized noisemap to Eve after every step of the protocol.
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The system E abovemay contain any purification of the initial states Eve provided.
In this work, we use the term security in a generic sense, and the precisemeaning depends on the context. For
instance, inQKDapplications, securitymeans that Alice and Bob establish a perfectly randomand secret key
which the adversary has negligible information about [5, 6, 9, 35–37]. In recent times, composable security
definitions have become commonplace, inwhich, roughly speaking, security is defined via an ideal process, and
security level via the amount bywhich the process realized by the protocol deviates from the ideal process. In the
context ofQKD, this distance reduces to the distance on the generated final states of the ideal versus realized
protocol. The ideal protocol outputs a completelymixed state onAlice and Bobs systemwhich is in tensor
product with Eve.More formally, see also [9], aQKDprotocol is said to be ε-secure for initial state ABEr if
5S S CE SS CE 1A B s s s e- Ä  ( )
holds where idS S CE E ABEA B s r= Ä( )( ), SA and SB denote the output systems of Alice and Bob (corresponding
the generated key),C denotes the classical communication and S s s s s1SS s Ss = å ñá Ä ñáÎ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ for orthogonal
states s. The state SS CEs sÄ corresponds to the output of the ideal protocol.
The confidentiality criterionwhichwe introduce here follows the distance-on-maps approach introduced in
the context of QKD like in e.g. [8]. Observe that such an approach is especially tailored to compose different
protocols, as the confidentiality definition concerns the distance of the real process with respect to an ideal
process. Therefore the real and idealmaps l,a ( ) and l,a ( ) respectively aremotivated by abstracting the protocol
in terms of processes. It is straightforward to abstract and define the idealmap in terms of input and output
relations, reflecting an ideal entanglement distillation process. Aswe discuss above, the ideal protocol has an ok-
and fail-branch. The fail-branch corresponds to the casewhenever Alice and Bob abort the procedure,
outputting the state ABEs^ . However, if the procedure succeeds thenwemight think of the idealmap as running
the entanglement distillation protocol for infinitelymany initial states, ending up in the fixed state ABE
l, ,sa of the
entanglement distillation protocol  for noise levelα.We observe two important facts regarding that particular
state:first, its the best the entanglement distillation protocol  can do in the presence of noise of levelα, and
second, as Eve is disentangled fromAlice andBob, this state is useful for applications like quantum teleportation.
Hencewe refer to this state also as a private state, or equivalently, Alice and Bob share private entanglement. In
contrast to (5), the target state ABE
l, ,sa in the ok-branch is only in tensor product with respect to Eve if the noise
transcripts do not leak to the adversary. In that case a secure quantum channel is feasible in terms of quantum
teleportation. Otherwise, that is if the noise transcripts ijh ñ∣ leak to Eve, she is in a separable state with respect to
Alice and Bob, but still enabling for confidential applications. By confidential wemean here thatwhen the final
state is used for quantum teleportation no information about the teleported state is leaked, but thefinal state
does not guarantee that Eve cannot change the teleported state. This observationmotivates the term
confidentiality rather than security.
The classical communication is not correlated to the output of the real protocol, thus it can be ignored, see
appendix A for details. The robustness of the protocol5 is considered in appendix E, which enables us to assume
for the subsequent analysis that all basic distillation steps succeed.
4.Main contribution
We summarize themain findings of our paper as follows: recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols
prepended by a symmetrization and a systemdiscarding step enable confidentiality, provided that the noise
transcripts do not leak to the adversary for all noise levelsα for which distillationwould be possible in the i.i.d.
case.We also show that this alone implies that the final state in the accepting branch, is close to a tensor product
state—Eve is factored out. The results regarding the BBPSSWprotocol [28] are analytic whereas for theDEJMPS
protocol [19] the results rely on strong numerical evidence. For lownoise rates, we achieve better results via the
post-selection-based reduction. In that case, no systemdiscarding step is necessary. Finally wefind that if an
entanglement distillation protocol is confidential when the noise transcripts do not leak, then it also confidential
if they do leak to the adversary. In particular, even in the case that Eve picks up information about all the realized
noise processes during the protocol, the final output system still enables confidential quantum applications like
e.g. quantum teleportation. The paper proceeds as follows.We establish necessary conditions to guarantee
confidentiality for recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols restricted to i.i.d. inputs whenever the
noise transcripts are not leaked to Eve. Then, we generalize this to arbitrary initial states via the de-Finetti
theorem [25]. Next, we use them to prove the confidentiality criterion (4) for entanglement distillation protocols
where the noise transcripts are not leaked. Finally, this will be used to derive the confidentiality boundwhenever
the noise transcripts are leaked.
5
The robustness is quantified by the abort probability in the all-honest, but noisy setting.
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5. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
5.1. Entanglement distillation for i.i.d inputs
The basic step of a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol is summarized as follows: Alice and Bob
share two noisy Bell-pairs, i.e. both have two qubits, each representing a ‘half’ of a noisy Bell pair, and theyfirst
apply local operations to their respective parts of the Bell-pairs; next, theymeasure one Bell-pair and classically
communicate their outcomes. Depending on the entanglement distillation protocol and the outcomes they
either keep or discard the unmeasured pair. The basic step is applied to all pairs of the initial states, which
comprises one distillation round. This distillation round is iteratedwhere output states of the previous round are
used as inputs for the next round. In the limit, a noiseless entanglement distillation protocol outputs a perfect
Bell-pair (implying that Eve is factored out).
Here, we allow for any type of noise acting (independently) on the single- and two-qubit gates appearing in
the protocol6. Using the results of [26], by utilizing randombasis changes and adding additional noise, any such
general noise can be brought to a standard form: depolarizing noise for imperfect single- and two-qubit CNOT-
type operations, see appendix A. Thus, it is sufficient to address noise in such standard form.
For such noise, one can analytically show [27] that for the BBPSSWprotocol [28], there exists a unique
attractingfixed point of the protocol which only depends on the noise parameters. That is, whenever the fidelity
of the initial states is above someminimum fidelity Fmin, depending on the noise parameters, the protocol
converges towards that uniquefixed point whichwe denote by AB
;Bsa . Observe that AB;Bsa is related to ABEl, ,sa of (3)
by letting B = and tracing out Eves system, i.e. trAB E ABEl;B ,B,s s=a a[ ]. In particular, wemean by B = that the
BBPSSWprotocol is used for entanglement distillation.Wefind that the output state AB
Ns , where N nlog2=




1 Bs s- a  , where B is a
function ofN, and it holds that F n O n bB B  Î a-( ) ( )( ) and b0 log 3 1B 2a< -( ) .
For the entanglement distillation protocol ofDeutsch et al [19] (referred to as theDEJMPS protocol) the
fixed point analysis ismore complicated. In the noiseless case, DEJMPSwas proven to have a unique attracting
fixed point [29]. For the noisy case, we can only provide extensive numerical evidence that there exists a unique
attractingfixed point, depending on the noise parameters only whichwe denote by AB
;Dsa , see A.1. Again, observe
that AB
;Dsa is related to ABEl, ,sa of (3) by setting D = and tracing out Eves system, i.e. trAB E ABE l;D ,D,s s=a a[ ].We
numerically find that for the state AB





1 Ds s- a  where D is a function ofN, and it holds that F n O n bD D  Î a-( ) ( )( ) . bD a( ) is a
positive function.Wenote that a similar analysis, but alsowith analyticfindings for the noiseless DEJMPS
protocol wasfirst performed in [29].
We reiterate that we assume for our analysis that all basic distillation steps succeed, sincewe deal with failures
due to the entanglement distillation protocol with a quadratic overhead in terms of initial states, see appendix E.
Thefinal state of the entanglement distillation protocol  in the ok-branch, ABs , depends onwhether the
parameter estimation on n initial states was accurate or not. The latter occurs with an exponentially small
probability in terms of initial states, see the discussion of the robustness of the protocol in appendix E. This in
turn implies that the parameter estimationwas accurate with probability exponentially close to unity. Therefore
the results regarding n i.i.d. initial states as input to the distillation protocol  above imply that
p n p n n n2 , 6AB AB
;
1 PE     s s e- + ¢ +r a  ( ) ( ) ≕ ( ) ( )
where p O nexpPE Î -( ( )) for all i.i.d. inputs ABn nrÄ + . This equation attains exactly the same form for both
protocols with the difference in the labels, so if we substitute  with B (bywriting, for example nB ( ))we refer to
the BBPSSWprotocol, where substituting  with D refers to theDEJMPS protocol. In similar fashionwe refer
fromnowby n ( ) to n ¢ ( ) for the sake of clarity. So to summarize, the distance for n n+ i.i.d. initial states
in the ok-branch of the protocol is bounded by n ne +( ).
Since, in the abort case, the outputs of the overall protocol a and the ideal protocol a are identical we
obtain that




1   r s s e- = -a a r aÄ   ( )( ) ( ) ( )
where the probability pr depends on the initial state ρ for both protocols and corresponds to the probability of
parameter estimation succeeding and completing n nlog2 -( ) distillation layers successfully for initial state ρ.
Hence, in both cases, thefinal distance to the respective fixed points scales polynomial in terms of n.
The functions bB a( ) and bD a( ) of the local noise levelα govern the rate of convergence of the real protocol
to the ideal protocol in the i.i.d case for entanglement distillation protocols.We numerically found that these
functionsmonotonically increase as the local noise rateα tends to zero appendix A. Thus, increasing thefidelity
6
We assume that the noise characteristics of the quantumgates are constant throughout the protocol.
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of local devices (through e.g. fault tolerance) directly influences the rate of convergence, which in turn governs
the confidentiality level.
In contrast to bB a( ), the function bD a( ) is not upper bounded, which implies that for certain noise
parametersα theDEJMPS protocol needs to perform fewer distillation rounds than the BBPSSWprotocol to
achieve the required confidentiality levels. This fast convergence is crucial for the powerful post-selection
technique [8] for non i.i.d. initial states, which is not applicable for the BBPSSWprotocol.
Nowwe use the established fixed point properties of entanglement distillation protocols for i.i.d. initial states
to show that similar results hold for arbitrary initial states.
5.2. Entanglement distillation for arbitrary inputs
In generalizing the previous results to arbitrary initial states wemake use of the de Finetti theorem [25]. The basic
de-Finetti results guarantee that the reduced state trn k AB
nr- ( )( ) of a permutation-invariant n-partite state ABnr( ) is
close to an i.i.d state dAB
kòs sÄ , with distancewhich scales asO k n .( ) This enables the following lemma.
Lemma2. Let n k, Î where k n . Furthermore, let s t& be the real protocol and s t& the ideal protocol
including symmetrization and the tracing out of n k- pairs.Moreover, let ABr be a bipartitemixed state of n systems
shared by Alice and Bob and let  and  denote the real and ideal protocol after symmetrization and tracing out












   r r m m- + -
m
Ä Ä   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Proof. Let ABr be amixed state. After Alice andBob apply a symmetrization they share a permutation invariant
state ABr˜ . Thuswe can apply theorem II.7 of [25] and have for trABk n k ABx r-≔ [˜ ] the inequality




AB 1 òx m m- Ä ( ) for some probabilitymeasurem on the set ofmixed states on AB.Moreover
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m
- = - - + -
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       
     
   
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
which completes the proof. ,
Therefore the application of the de-Finetti theorem introduces an additive term k
n
64 when reducing arbitrary
initial states to i.i.d. initial states. As the right hand side of (8) is independent of the initial state ABr , (8) holds for
all initial states ABr .
In (8)wehave omitted the superscriptα characterizing the noise level, andwewill use it only if it is
specifically needed. Inequality (8) implies that the properties of the fixed point (uniqueness, attractivity, noise-
dependence) also hold for arbitrary initial states, if the protocol is prepended by symmetrization and a trace-out
step. This enables us to prove the confidentiality criterion of definition 1 for entanglement distillation protocols,
where the noise transcripts of L are not leaked, whichwill, in turn, imply the confidentiality criterion (4)
whenever the noise transcripts are leaked.
5.3. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
The inequality in (7) establishes the local properties of the protocol, and ismore-or-less typical for studies of the
convergence of entanglement distillation protocols in the i.i.d. case. However, it falls short of the complete
characterization captured by the confidentiality criterion (4) in twoways:first, the input states are restricted
(i.i.d.); second, it fails to consider the purifying systemof Eve7, vital in cryptographic contexts.While the prior
issue is the subject of de-Finetti and post-selection-type reductions, the latter issue can be a problem in general,
as small distance of corresponding subsystems does not imply a small distance of the total systems.
However, we can resolve this issue by using thefixed point properties of entanglement distillation protocols.
More precisely, we relate the two distances by the following general lemma, proven in the appendix B.1.
7
Technically, inequality (7) is a statement about the operator norm-induced distance onmaps, where expression of (4) is the completely
bounded diamond norm, relevant for security statements.
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Lemma3. Let ρ be an arbitrarymixed state shared by Alice and Bob and let ABEyñ∣ be a purification thereof held by
Eve. Furthermore, let 1 correspond to a (distillation-type) real protocol and 2 correspond to the associated
(distillation-type) ideal protocol, i.e.
p p
p p
ok ok 1 fail fail ,









= Ä ñá + - Ä ñá







( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
whereα characterizes the level of the noise, ABsa , and ABs^ are two fixed two qubit states. Furthermore, let 1 and 2
satisfy the following properties:
(1) The noise transcripts do not leak to Eve.
(2) The protocol 1 guarantees to converge towards some state ABsa within the ok-branch of the protocol
andmax AB1 2 1AB   m e-m  ( )( ) .
Then it holds that
id id 34 4 1 . 9E E ABE1 2 1 8  y y eÄ - Ä ñá + ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( · ) ( )
The factor 34 4 18 +· arises as an upper bound on the distance of the given states from states in product form
based on the notion of non-steerability we introduce (see appendix B.1 for details). In our computationswe
managed to prove the key lemma in amanner which is proportional to the dimension of the systems,more
precisely, the overall size of the corresponding densitymatrix. Itmay be the case that the bound of lemma 3
could holdwithout the dependence on the system size (and indeed, with smaller constants), however this was
not necessary for our purposes.
Lemma 3 is vital as it allows us to employ the de-Finetti theorem [25]. Hence, for the protocols s t& and
s t& , by combining lemma 2with lemma 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem4 (de-Finetti-based reduction technique). Let s t& be the real protocol and s t& the ideal protocol
including symmetrization and the tracing out of n k- pairs, taking n input pairs and k n and utilizing
entanglement distillation protocol  . Thenwe have
k
n
kmax id id 34 4 1
64
, 10s t E s t E& & 1 8
ABE




⎠( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( · ) ( ) ( )∣
where ke ( ) denotes themaximumdistance of the real and ideal protocol without symmetrization and tracing out
step using entanglement distillation protocol  in the ok-branch for k i.i.d. initial states, i.e. equation (7).
Proof. Suppose Eve prepares a purification ABEyñ∣ of the state ABr shared byAlice and Bob. Recall that the real
and ideal protocol including symmetrization and the tracing out of n k- pairs applied to initial state ABr read as
p p
p p
ok ok 1 fail fail ,











= Ä ñá + - Ä ñá







( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣











    r s s m- = - + -r a m
Ä     ⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
where  and  denote the real and ideal protocol after symmetrization and tracing out n k- pairs. Since the
right-hand side of (11) is independent of the initial state ABr it holds for all initial states of the protocol.
Therefore, the properties of thefixed point (unique, attracting and depending on the noise parameters only)
translate from i.i.d. initial states to arbitrary initial states. Hence the protocol guarantees that it converges
towards thefixed point of the entanglement distillation protocol.





. 12s t s t AB
& &
1  r e- +  ⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠( )( ) ( ) ( )
This implies that the real protocol indeed converges towards the fixed point, and, thuswe can apply lemma 3 to
the protocols s t& and s t& for the purification ABEyñ∣ of ABr andwe find by using (12) that
k
n
kid id 34 4 1
64
. 13s t E s t E& & 1 8  y y y y eÄ ñá - Ä ñá + +  ⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( · ) ( ) ( )
Taking themaximum in (13) completes the proof. ,
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Thus, we can reach arbitrary confidentiality levels, however at the cost of wasting some pairs. The scaling of
the confidentiality parameter, i.e. the right-hand side of (10), is linear in the number of initial states n, due to the
use of the ‘basic’ de Finetti approach.
If the local noise is low, we can do better in terms of scaling and efficiency, using the post-selection technique
[8]. For that purpose, wefirst establish a result similar to (9) by using the fact that the resulting state of the
protocol, including L, is pure, see appendix A.More precisely, we have the following lemma, proven in the
appendix B.2.
Lemma5. Let  be the real protocol which guarantees to converge towards a unique and attracting fixed point
depending on the noise parameter only and let  be the ideal protocol. Furthermore let ρ be amixed state (consisting
ofn systems) shared byAlice and Bob. If the extension of  and  to the system of L satisfies
nL L 1  r r e- ( ) ( ) ( ), then
nid id 4E ABE E ABE 1  y y y y eÄ ñá - Ä ñá¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )
for all purifications ABEyñ ¢∣ of r.
This lemma allows us to prove the closeness on any purification from the closeness of the reduced systems,
andfinally to derive confidentiality from the performance of the ideal protocol via the following theorem.
Theorem6 (Post-selection-based reduction technique). Let s be the real protocol and s the ideal protocol





1AB   m m e-m Ä Ä ( ) ( ) ( ), see (7), where  and  denote the sub-protocols after symmetrization (i.e.
the protocols without the symmetrization step) and  the entanglement distillation protocol. Thenwe have
g nmax id id 4 2 , 14s E s E n d1 ,
ABE





Proof.Weobserve that s and s are permutation invariantmaps due to the symmetrizazion step. Thuswe can
apply the post-selection technique of [8]which implies
g
max id id















y y y y
t t t t
Ä ñá - Ä ñá
Ä ñá - Ä ñá
yñ ¢ ¢




( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ )
( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )
∣
where ABEtñ ¢∣ is a purification of the de-Finetti Hilbert–Schmidt state, hence
tr dE ABE AB
nòt t m h m tñá = ¢¢ ¢ Ä[∣ ∣ ] ( ) ≕ where h is themeasure induced by theHilbert–Schmidtmetric on
End 4( ). Furthermore, we note that we have for the extensions of s and s to L, i.e. themaps Ls and Ls , that
















     òt t m h m m¢ - ¢ = - -mÄ Ä   ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
According to appendix A.1.1, which implies that the distance including L scales as the square root of the 1-norm





1AB   m m e-m Ä Ä ( ) ( ) ( ) that
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Ä
¢




which completes the proof. ,
Observe that ne ( ), which governs the rate of convergence of the overall protocol, relates to the rate of
convergence of the entanglement distillation protocol  via n n n e = -( ) ( ), as n initial states are used
for parameter estimation.We remind the reader that the preprocessing steps (symmetrization, tracing out) of
the entanglement distillation protocol and the lemmas of this section are non-trivial and crucial for the proof of
the de-Finetti-based and post-selection-based reduction technique.
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Furthermore we point out that the proof regarding the BBPSSWprotocol is analytic and necessarily relies on
the de-Finetti-based reduction technique because of its slow convergence rate. The rate of convergence for the
BBPSSWprotocol can easily be derived, see appendix A for details. For theDEJMPS protocol it turns out that we
have polynomial scaling depending on the noise parameterα, i.e.
n O nmax AB
n b
1 DAB
D  s e- £s aÄ - ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) , see (7).
However, the protocol needs to converge sufficiently quickly, as the post-selection technique incurs a
multiplicative increase in the effective distance between real and ideal protocols, which scales as a (15 degree)
polynomial in n, see (14). The resulting confidentiality level scales therefore asO n b15 4D a-( )( ) , which leads to an
acceptable noise level that is rather low, e.g. about 10−19 for theDEJMPS protocol in the setting of binary pairs8,
see appendix A.1.1. This very low rate is due to the polynomial factor introduced by applying the post-selection
technique, i.e. gn d, in (14)with d=4.Observe that these small rates are determined by properties of recurrence-
type entanglement distillation protocols, i.e. b a( ) for the recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols
studied here, andmay be improved by either considering hashing-type protocols [30] or through fault-tolerant
constructions. Indeed, the noise threshold for fault-tolerant quantum computation also applies to this case,
yielding a tolerable noise level of about 10−4.We reiterate that the post-selection technique is not applicable to
the BBPSSWprotocol, due to its slow convergence.
5.4. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols when the noise transcripts leak
Finally, we provide confidentiality guarantees for entanglement distillation protocols when the noise transcripts
are leaked to Eve. For that purpose, we relate the confidentiality criterion (4) for protocols where the noise
transcripts are leaked to the earlier results.More formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem7. Let  be the real protocol and  be the ideal protocol satisfying the assumptions of lemma 3.
Furthermore, let l denote the real and l the ideal protocol when the noise transcripts leak to Eve. Then
nid id , implies 18E E 1  y y eÄ - Ä ñá ( )(∣ ∣) ( ) ( )
nid id 2l E l E 1  y y eÄ - Ä ñá ( )(∣ ∣) ( )
for all purifications ABEyñ∣ of initial state ABr consisting of n systems.
The proof, see appendix C, uses the unitary equivalence of purifications. Theorem7 establishes via (18) that
if an entanglement distillation protocol is ε-confidential according to definition 1 then the protocol is
2 e -confidential if the noisy apparatus leaks the noise transcripts.
6.Discussion
Wehave shown that recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols ensure private entanglement without
referring to the asymptotic limit. This holds true evenwhen the local devices are noisy, andwhen the potential
eavesdropper is able to completelymonitor the operation of these devices in run-time (i.e., the noisy apparatus
leaks information about the realized noise processes). If the noise transcripts are not leaked, Eve is ‘factored
out’—in tensor product withAlice and Bob, and only classically correlated otherwise. Our protocol can, for
instance, be used to realize confidential quantum channels bymeans of teleportation—the only information
thatmay leak to Eve after teleportation is which noisemapwas applied to the sent state, but nothing about the
state itself (see appendix F for details).More generally, our results imply the confidentiality of the protocols in
arbitrary settings (beyond the application to quantum channels), thus opening theway for the confidential
realization of various quantum tasks: from establishing quantum channels and quantumnetworks, to
applications such as distributed quantum computation. Aside from cryptographic aspects, the proposed
protocol can be used to generate high quality entanglement fromnon-i.i.d. sources.
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AppendixA. Entanglement distillation for i.i.d. inputs
A.1. TheDEJMPSprotocol
Wefirst provide an overview of theDEJMPS protocol [19] and then extend the description incrementally to our
proposed setting (including L and Eve).
TheDEJMPS protocol is a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol which combines several noisy
copies of amixed state ρ to distill a state arbitrarily close to themaximally entangled state B00ñ∣ , where
B id 00 11 2ij x
j
z
is sñ = Ä ñ + ñ∣ ( )(∣ ∣ ) for i 0, 1Î { }and j 0, 1Î { }, provided that the fidelity
F B B00 00r= á ñ∣ ∣ satisfies F 1 2> for the noiseless case. If the apparatus is noisy, then theminimal required
fidelity Fneeds to satisfy F Fmin> (where Fmin depends on the noise level of the apparatus) to achieve
distillation. Formore details on recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols in general we refer the
interested reader to [31]. A basic step of theDEJMPS protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1.Basic step of theDEJMPS protocol
Require: Input state of Alice and Bob: a b a b, ,1 1 2 2r rÄ( ) ( )







b1 1 2 2= Ä Ä Äp s p s p s p s- -( ) ( ) ( ) ( ):
U U .x a b a b x
, ,1 1 2 2r rÄ( )( ) ( ) †
2: Alice and Bob apply a bilateral CNOT (BCNOT):
CNOT CNOT CNOT CNOT .a a b b a b a b a a b b, ,1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2r rÄ Ä Ä   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) †
3: Alice and Bob apply a idz
a
z
2s s= Ä( ) and a idzb z2s s= Ä( ) measurement
4: Alice and Bob communicate theirmeasurement outcomes, za and zb respectively, over a classical authentic channel
5: if za= zb then
6: Alice and Bob keep the subsystems a1 and b1 of step 2
7: Alice and Bob discard themeasured subsystems a2 and b2
8: else
9: Alice and Bob discard both pairs
10: end if
Hence, we canwrite one basic distillation step of theDEJMPS protocol as the linearmap
O O O2 EPP 2 EPP 2 EPPr r r rÄ = ¢ Ä ¢- - -( ) ( ) † where




a a b b x2 EPP ,1 1
2 2
1 2 1 2
¢ = Ä Ä Ä-  ( )( )( ) ( )
modulo a normalization factor andwhere P z z z, 0, 1z = ñá Î∣ ∣ { }denotes the respective outcome of step 3 of
protocol 1.
The basic step is applied to all initial pairs, which comprises one distillation round. This distillation round is
iteratedwhere output states of the previous round are used as inputs for the next round. Sowe summarize the
DEJMPS protocol as follows:
Protocol 2.DEJMPS protocol





i ir=⨂ ( ) where F B B 1 2a b00 , 00i ir= á ñ >∣ ∣( ) for all i 1, .., 2nÎ { }
1: whilePairs left for distillation do
2: Apply protocol 1 to all pairs
3: Use the outputs of the previous step as input for the next distillation round
4: end while
We remind the reader that the recurrence relations of the protocol (i.e. update functions of the coefficients of an
ensemble) are central for the convergence analysis of theDEJMPS protocol. For Bell-diagonal states, i.e. states of
the form
p B B p B B p B B p B B ,00 00 00 11 11 11 01 01 01 10 10 10r = ñá + ñá + ñá + ñá∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
where p p1, 0ij ij ij å = , a straightforward computation yields the recurrence relations for theDEJMPS
protocol to be
10




































˜ ˜ ( )
where N p p p p00 11
2
01 10
2= + + +( ) ( ) , see e.g. [19].
In [29] it has been shown analytically that the recurrence relations (A.1) converge towards a unique and
attractingfixed point provided the initial fidelity with B00ñ∣ , p00, is above 1/2.
The recurrence relations of theDEJMPS protocol taking independent single qubit white noise, i.e. noise of
the form N f f1 4 x x y y z zr r r s rs s rs s rs= + - + + +( ) ( ) acting on each qubit of Alice into account, read
farmore complex. In the presence of noise we have strong numerical evidence that theDEJMPS protocol
converges towards a unique and attractingfixed point depending on the noise level f only.
From figure A1we suggest a linear relationship between log nfix 1r r-  (where fixr and nr denote thefixed
point and the state after successfully completing n distillation rounds respectively) and the number of successful
distillation rounds n.We immediately observe that the slope only depends on the noise parameter f, i.e. we have
that
a f nb flog .nfix 1r r- = -  ( ) ( )
Using N nlog2 = , whereN denotes the number of input pairs, this implies
e e a f Nn
a f b f N b f
fix 1
log2r r- = = ¢- - ¢  ( )( ) ( ) ( ), i.e. nfix 1r r-  scales as F N O N b fÎ - ¢( ) ( )( ) asmentioned in
themain text. Furthermore we numerically find that the function b f¢( )monotonically grows for f 1 .
For two qubit correlated noise, we refer the reader to the analysis including L, as the fixed point and the
scaling can be recovered from that analysis by tracing out the systemof L.
A.1.1. Detailed analysis including L. We outline the remainder of this section as follows: first we derive the
recurrence relations of theDEJMPS protocol in themost general setting, taking the noise applied by L into
account aswell as assuming that Eve receives the leaked noise transcripts of L.We use those recurrence relations
in the next subsection to provide analytical results regarding the fixed point of the recurrence relations, where
the inputs are binary pairs and L only applies either id or xs operators.We close the sectionwith numerical
results for general i.i.d. Bell-diagonal pairs and themost general noisemaps of L.
The recurrence relations
For i.i.d. input states the state of each system subject to distillation at an intermediate distillation round of the
DEJMPS protocol is of the form P B kl ijklABEL i j k l ijkl ij AB L E, , ,Yñ = å ñ ñ ñ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ , where Pijkl are probability amplitudes, if
we assume the noise is leaked to Eve after every distillation round. The systemABmodels the pair of Alice and
Bob, L the systemof L (where the content of the register corresponds to the effective noise introduced toAB) and
Figure A1.The figure illustrates log nfix 1r r-  for different noise parameters f=0.97 (blue), f=0.98 (green) and f=0.99 (red).
The fixed point fixr was evaluated for 500 iterations of theDEJMPS protocol.
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E the systemof Eve. L applies the noise processes before a basic protocol step to the systems of Alice.Moreover, L
keeps track of the effective noise introduced using its system in a sensewe clarify later.
In the followingwe use the notation
id, , ,x z y0,0 0,1 1,0 1,1s s s s s s s= = = =
for the four Pauli-operators. Furthermore we denote by superscripts in brackets particle labels and by
superscripts without brackets the power of an operator.
L introduces the noisemapsU U Ua a, , , , ,1 1 2 2 1 1
1
2 2
2= Äa b a b a b a b( ) ( ) whereU a a x x L, ,k k ks s s= Ä Äa b a b a b(( ) ( ))( ) ( ) ( ).We
observe that applying the noisemapU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b mightflip the contents of the registers L1 and L2 depending on the
values of , ,1 1 2a b a and 2b . This enables L to keep track of the noise introduced to a pair.
There are two approaches howL can apply the noisemapsU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b : stochastically in terms of CPTPmaps,
or coherently in terms of unitaries acting on an enlargedHilbert space.Here we assume the latter approach, but
provide the analysis of the noisyDEJMPS protocol in terms of CPTPmaps and purifications.
To show that these are equivalent, first suppose that L owns a registerH set to the state
f H, , , , , , 1 1 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 a b a bå ña b a b a b a b˜ ∣ where f , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b˜ are the probabilities of applying the respective noisemap
U , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b . L uses the registerH to apply the noisemapsU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b coherently controlled to the input state
ABELYñ∣ .We observe that tracing outH after applying all the noisemapsU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b in a controlled fashion yields
f U U .
, , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
å YñáY Ä YñáY
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b˜ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) †
On the other hand, assume that L applies the noise process in terms of aCPTPmapN, i.e.
N f U U .
, , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
år = YñáY Ä YñáY
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b˜ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) †
Weobserve that Nr will be, in general, amixed state, thus there exists a purification on a largerHilbert space. As
all purifications are unitarily equivalent, see e.g. [32], we choose the purification
f U .H
, , ,
, , , , , , 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
å a b a bFñ = Yñ Ä Yñ Ä ñ
a b a b
a b a b a b a b∣ ˜ ∣ ∣ ∣
Hence NtrH rFñáF =[∣ ∣] . Furthermore, we observe that the pure state Fñ∣ can be generated by applying the
unitariesU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b , coherently controlled by the registerH,
to f H, , , , , , 1 1 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 a b a bYñ Ä Yñ Ä å ña b a b a b a b∣ ∣ ( ˜ ∣ ).
This equivalence allows us to assume that L introduces the noise as a CPTPmap, applyingU , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b with
respective probabilities f , , ,1 1 2 2a b a b and purifying the state after the basic distillation step is executed byAlice
and Bob.
Since the noise of L is applied before the basic distillation step is executed byAlice and Bob, the result of one
noisy distillation step reads as
f U O U U U U O U , A.2u
a a a a
u
, , ,
, , , 2 EPP , , , , 2 EPP
1 1 2 2







2år¢ = ¢ Ä YñáY Ä YñáY Ä ¢
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b- -˜ ( )(∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) † † †
which needsfinally to be purified.
In order to evaluate (A.2), we proceed as follows:
• Step 1:Wefirst compute
O U U ,a a2 EPP , ,1 1
1
2 2
2¢ Ä Yñ Ä Yña b a b- ( )∣ ∣( ) ( )
which corresponds to the state after the noisemapU Ua a, ,1 1
1
2 2
2Äa b a b( ) ( ) is applied by L and the basic distillation step
of the entanglement distillation protocol is executed byAlice and Bob.
• Step 2:We apply the unitaryUu, which acts only on L’s systems andwhose purpose we clarify later, to the
previous equality.
• Step 3:We have to determine the purification held by Eve if the noise is leaked to her. In doing so, we trace out
Eve and then provide herwith the purification of the resulting state (which corresponds to leaking the noise
transcripts to Eve).
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Step 1:We observe that applying the noisemapU a,
1a b
( ) to Yñ∣ yields
U U P B kl ijkl
P B k l ijkl
P B kl i j k l . A.3
a a
i j k l
ijkl ij AB L E
i j k l
ijkl i j AB L E
i j k l









a b a b
Yñ= ñ ñ ñ
= ñ Å Å ñ ñ
= ñ ñ Å Å Å Å ñ
a b a b
a b
a b a b
Å Å
Å Å Å Å
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
∣ ∣( )( ) ∣
∣ ∣ ∣( )( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )( )( )
This observation suggests the following notational simplifications:
P P e i j k land .ijkl i j k l ijkl E Ea b a b= ñ = Å Å Å Å ñab a b a b abÅ Å Å Å ∣ ∣( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( )
Using this notationwe rewrite (A.3) asU P B kl ea i j k l ijkl ij AB L ijkl E, , , ,1 Yñ = å ñ ñ ña b ab ab∣ ∣ ∣ ∣( ) . This is the state of Alice, Bob, L,
and Eve after the noisemapU a,
1a b
( ) is applied by L to thefirst pair. In order to compute (A.2)wedefine
U U
A P B B k l k l
e e ,
a a
i j i j k l k l
i j k l i j k l i j AB i j AB L L
i j k l E i j k l E
, , , , ,
, , , , , ,
1 1 2 2




1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
1 1




Y ñ= Ä Yñ Yñ
= ñ ñ ñ ñ
Ä ñ ñ
a b a b a b a b
a b a b
a b a b
∣ ( )∣ ∣
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
∣ ∣
( ) ( )
which corresponds to the state after the noisemapU Ua a, ,1 1
1
2 2
2Äa b a b( ) ( ) is applied and
U O , A.4u, , , 2 EPP , , ,1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2Y¢ ñ = Y ña b a b a b a b-∣ ∣ ( )
which is the state after the noisemapU Ua a, ,1 1
1
2 2
2Äa b a b( ) ( ) , one basic distillation step and the update of L’s noise
register byUu. Thuswe rewrite (A.2) as
f . A.5
, , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
år¢ = Y¢ ñáY¢
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b˜ ∣ ∣ ( )
According to (A.4)Alice andBob apply one basic distillation step of theDEJMPS protocol to the state
, , ,1 1 2 2Y ña b a b∣ . Recall that step 1 of protocol 1maps Bijñ∣ to Bi i j ñÅ∣ ( ) and that step 2maps B Bij i jñ ñ¢ ¢∣ ∣ to
B Bi i j i j jñ ñÅ ¢ ¢ Å ¢∣ ∣( ) ( ) . Thuswe conclude that after step 1 and 2 of protocol 1 the state of Alice, Bob, L, and Eve is
P P B B k l k l e e . A.6
i j i j k l k l
i j k l i j k l i i i j AB i i j i j AB L L i j k l E i j k l E
, , , , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 2 2 2 2
2 2
2å å ñ ñ ñ ñ ñ ña b a b a b a bÅ Å Å Å Å∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )( )( ) ( )
Following protocol 1, a zs -measurement of the target pair of the BCNOT, i.e. the subsystemAB2, is applied to
(A.6). Next Alice and Bob communicate their respectivemeasurement outcomes over a classic authentic
channel. If themeasurement outcomes coincide, Alice and Bob keep the source pair, i.e. subsystemAB1 of step 2,
else they discard both subsystemsAB1 andAB2.We assume that bothmeasurements yield the outcome 1. If both
measurement outcomes yield 0, no phase factor 1 i2-( ) would be required in the expression (A.7). The coinciding
measurement outcomes imply i j i j 01 1 2 2Å Å Å = . To summarize, the state post-selected on themeasure-
ment outcomes 1 of Alice and Bob is
P P B k l k l e e1 . A.7
i j i j k l k l
i
i j k l i i j i k l i i i j AB L L i j k l E i i j i k l E
, , , , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2å å - ñ ñ ñ ñ ña b a b a b a bÅ Å Å Å Å Å( ) ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
Step 2: Recall that L stores in its register attached to the pair of Alice and Bob the effective noise introduced. For
that purpose we introduce the unitaryUu aswell as an ancilla system L3 set to the state 00 L3ñ∣ . ApplyingUu to all
three registers of L yieldsU i j i j u i j i j i j i j00 , , ,u ñ ñ ñ ¢ñ ¢ñ = ¢ ¢ ñ ñ ñ ¢ñ ¢ñ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ where u is the so calledflag update
function defined in [20]. The function u returns the effective noise introduced on the source pair of step 2 of
protocol 1. ApplyingUu to (A.7) gives
P P B k l k l u k l k l
e e
1 , , ,
.
i j i j k l k l
i
i j k l i i j i k l i i i j AB L L L
i j k l E i i j i k l E
, , ,
, , , , , ,
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2
å åY¢ ñ = - ñ ñ ñ ñ
Ä ñ ñ
a b a b
a b a b
a b a b
Å Å Å Å
Å Å
∣ ( ) ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
∣ ∣
( ) ( )( )
( )
We remind the reader that , , ,1 1 2 2Y¢ ña b a b∣ is the state after the application of (i) the noisemapU Ua a, ,1 11 2 22Äa b a b( ) ( ) , (ii) a
basic distillation step, and (iii) the update of L’s noise register byUu.
Step 3: Since the noise transcripts—by assumption for this analysis—leak to Eve, we attribute the systems L1
and L2 to Eve. In order to treat themost general situation, we assume that Eve holds a purification of
trL L E E, , ,1 2 1 2 r¢[ ].We determine this purification by computing trL L1 ,1 2r r¢ = ¢[ ]and trE E2 , 11 2r r¢ = ¢[ ] and attribute the
purification of 2r¢ to Eve.
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By the linearity of the partial trace we have
ftr tr .L L L L1 ,
, , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
år r¢ = ¢ = Y¢ ñáY¢
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b[ ] ˜ [∣ ∣ ]
It is useful to define trL L, , , , , , , , , ,1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2r¢ = Y¢ ñáY¢a b a b a b a b a b a b[∣ ∣]which evaluates to
P P P P B B
u k l k l u k l k l e e e e
tr
1
, , , , , , .
L L
i i
i j k l i i j i k l i j k l i i j i k l i i i j i i i j
i j k l i j k l i i j i k l i i j i k l
, , , , , , , , , ,
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
*å
r¢ = Y¢ ñáY¢
= - ñá
Ä ñá Ä ñá Ä ñá
a b a b a b a b a b a b
a b a b a b a b
a b a b a b a b
Å ¢ Å Å ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢Å ¢Å ¢ Å Å ¢Å ¢ ¢Å ¢
¢ ¢ Å Å ¢ ¢Å ¢Å ¢
[∣ ∣ ]
( ) ( ) ∣ ∣
∣ ( ) ( )∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
In the previous expressionwe neglected the indices appearing in the sum for simplicity, but it is understood that
the sum ranges over all indices except , ,1 1 2a b a and 2b .
In order to determine the state of Alice, Bob, and Lwhich Evefinally purifies we have to compute
trE E2 , 11 2r r¢ = ¢[ ]. Again, the linearity of the partial trace yields
ftr tr . A.8E E E E2 , 1
, , ,
, , , , , , ,1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
år r r¢ = ¢ = ¢
a b a b
a b a b a b a b[ ] ˜ [ ] ( )
We remind the reader that e i j k lijkl E E1 1a b a bñ = Å Å Å Å ñab∣ ∣( )( )( )( ) . Hence, forfixed 1a and 1b , we have
e etr i j k l i j k l i i j j1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
d dñá =a b a b¢ ¢ ¢ ¢∣ ∣ , which implies that i i1 1¢ = and j j1 1¢ = . Thus, we also have
e e e etr tr .i i j i k l i i j i k l i i j i k l i i j i k l i i2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
dñá = ñá =a b a b a b a bÅ Å ¢ ¢Å ¢Å ¢ Å Å ¢ Å Å ¢ ¢∣ ∣ ∣ ∣( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Hence
P P P P
B B u k l k l u k l k l
P P
B B u k l k l u k l k l
tr
, , , , , ,
, , , , , , . A.9
E E
i i j k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l i j k l i i j i k l
i i i j i i i j
i i j k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
i i i j i i i j
, , , ,
, , , , ,
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, , , , ,
2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
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2 2
1 1 1 1
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2 1 1 2 2 2
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1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2





´ ñá Ä ñá
=
´ ñá Ä ñá
a b a b
a b a b a b a b
a b a b
Å Å Å Å
Å Å Å Å
Å Å
Å Å Å Å
[ ]
( )
∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) ( )∣
∣ ∣
∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) ( )∣ ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
By inserting (A.9) in (A.8)we get
f
f P P
B B u k l k l u k l k l
B B f P P
tr
tr




i i j k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
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u k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
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, , ,
, , , , , , ,
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, , ,
, , , , ,
2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, , ,
, , , ,
, , ,
2
0 1 0 1
k l k l
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
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Rearranging the sumover i i,1 2 and j1 in the previous equation gives
B B f P P
. A.10
i i i j u k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
, ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
2
0 1 0 1
i i j k l k l
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1
1 2 0 1 1 1
1, 2, 1
1 1 2 2 0 1
1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2å å å å




d d d d
g g d d g g
a b a b
a b a b
Å = Å = =








∣ ∣ ( )
( ) ( )
( )
Using the definition
P f P P , A.11
i i i j u k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
2
, , , , ,
, , ,
2
i i j k l k l
0 1 0 1
1 2 0 1 1 1
1, 2, 1
1 1 2 2 0 1
1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2å å=d d g g
d d g g
a b a b
a b a b
Å = Å = =
Å Åa b a b
∣ ˜ ∣ ˜ ∣ ∣ ( )
( ) ( )
( )
where , , , 0, 10 1 0 1d d g g Î { }and omitting the normalization factor for clarity, (A.10) simplifies to
B B P ,
, ,
2
0 1 0 1
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1
0 1 0 1å å g g g gñá Ä ñá
d d
d d d d
g g
d d g g∣ ∣ ∣ ˜ ∣ ∣ ∣
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which is the state of Alice, Bob, and L after one noisy distillation step. Since this final state is purified by Evewith
the leaked noise transcripts and all purifications are unitarily equivalent, the state of Alice, Bob, L, and Eve after
one noisy distillation step can bewrittenwithout loss of generality as
P B .AB L EDEJMPS
, , ,
, , , , 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1åy g g d d g gñ = ñ ñ ñ
d d g g
d d g g d d∣ ˜ ∣ ∣ ∣
This also implies that (A.11) are the recurrence relations of the noisyDEJMPS protocol.
Fixed point and convergence—binary pairs
First we study the scaling of the systems of Alice, Bob, and L and extend those results then to the (possibly
leaked)noise transcripts of Eve in terms of purifications.
Suppose that the initial i.i.d. pairs of Alice and Bob aremixtures of B00ñ∣ and B01ñ∣ and that L applies either the
identity or a xs -operator with respective probabilities f0˜ and f f11 0= -˜ ˜ independently to each pair.We remind
the reader that Eve purifies the state of Alice, Bob, and Lwith the leaked noise transcripts, i.e. each individual
state taking Eve into account at an intermediate round of theDEJMPS protocol reads as
P Bi j ij i AB j L ij E, 0 h hå ñ Ä ñ Ä ñ∣ ∣ ∣ . Using p Pij ij 2= ∣ ∣ , the recurrence relations (A.11) for the settingwe are
concernedwith here simplify to








10 11 0 1 11 00 10 00 11 01= + + + + + +˜ ( ˜ ( ) ˜ ( ) ˜ ˜ ( )) ( )
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2= + +˜ ( ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ) ( )








00 01 0 1 01 10 00 10 01 11= + + + + + +˜ ( ˜ ( ) ˜ ( ) ˜ ˜ ( )) ( )




0 1 00 11 1
2
00
2= + +˜ ( ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ) ( )









0 1 00 01 10 11= + + + + + + +( ˜ ˜ )(( ) ( ) ) ˜ ˜ ( )( ). In the followingwe
denote the recurrence relations (A.12)–(A.15) by the vector-valuedmapping f , i.e. p p,
f ˜ where
p p p pp , , ,00 01 10 11= ( ). A simple computation yields the following fixed points of f :
p f f p p p p1 2 4 3 4 2 0 1 , A.16
00 0 0 01 10 11 00
= + - - = = = -¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥˜ ( ˜ ) ( )
p f f p p p p1 2 4 3 4 2 0 1 , A.17
00 0 0 01 10 11 00
= - - - = = = -¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥˜ ( ˜ ) ( )
p p p p1 2 0. A.18
00 11 01 10
= = = =¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ( )
The parameter estimation phase guarantees that the fidelity Fwith B00ñ∣ is sufficiently high for distillation.Hence
thefixed point of interested is (A.16), i.e.
f f f fp 1 2 4 3 4 2 , 0, 0, 1 2 4 3 4 2 . A.190 0 0 0= + - - - - -¥ ( ˜ ( ˜ ) ˜ ( ˜ )) ( )
From (A.19)we observe that in the limit the ‘cross-probabilities’ p01 and p10, vanish, hence L is fully correlated
toAB.
It is of central importance, regarding convergence that thefixed point p¥ is an attractor, as only this ensures
convergence towards thatfixed point. Note that p¥ is an attractor if and only if the largest eigenvalue maxl of
f p¢ ¥( ) satisfies 1maxl < .We easilyfind that f f f f4 3 2 1 1max 0 0 0 0l = - - - <( ˜ ˜ ˜ ) ( ˜ ) for f0.78 10 ˜ .
Thefixed point p¥ enables us to determine the rate of convergence. For that purpose, we expand f in terms
of its Taylor series around the fixed point p¥, i.e. p f p f p f p p p .= » + ¢ -¥ ¥ ¥˜ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) Hence by defining
e p p= - ¥wefind e f p e= ¢ ¥˜ ( ) , providing an estimate of the error propagation for one successful distillation
round. The state of Alice, Bob, and L after n successful distillation rounds and at the fixpoint read as
p B Bn ij ij
n
i i AB j j L0 0r h h= å ñá Ä ñá∣ ∣ ∣ ∣( ) and p B Bi ii i i AB i i Lfix 0 0r h h= å ñá Ä ñá¥∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ respectively, which implies for
their distance induced by the 1-norm
























( )∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
( )
( ) ( )
where xx i
k
i1;v 1= å =  ∣ ∣denotes the 1-normof vectors in k .
Equation (A.20) only concerns the systems of Alice, Bob, and L. To complete the analysis we recall that Eve
purifies nr and fixr with the leaked noise transcripts of L. If we take this purifying system,E, into account, i.e.
consider n n ABEL ABEL 1y y y yñá - ñáa a ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ where trn E n n ABELr y y= ñá[∣ ∣ ],
P BABEL i j ij i AB j L ij E, 0y h hñ = å ñ Ä ñ Ä ña ¥∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ with P pij ij2 =¥ ¥∣ ∣ and trE ABELfixr y y= ñáa a[∣ ∣ ], wefind
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A.21n n ABEL ABEL n1 y y y yñá - ñáa a ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
since purifications scale with a square root.
In order to apply the post-selection-based reduction, we need to relate the previously obtained results for
i.i.d. input pairs to general ensembles. As stated in themain text, we exclude the parameter estimation step on
n initial states for simplicity.We remind the reader, as we have stated in themain text, that for all purifications
ABEyñ ¢∣ of a n-partite input state ABr wehave




   y y y y sÄ ñá - Ä ñá -
s¢ ¢ ¢ ¢




12= + -( ). Thus, inserting the previous result for 2n i.i.d. input states (necessary to achieve n
rounds of distillation) in (A.22) yields
gid id 4 .E ABE E ABE d n1 2 ,
1 4
n   y y y yÄ ñá - Ä ñá¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ )
One square root in the expression above arises from inequality (A.21) and the other square root appears from
inequality (A.22).
Hence, for confidentiality we necessarily need g 0d n2 ,
1 4
n   for n  ¥. Thus n1 4 should decay faster
than g d2 ,n grows in n. Numerical simulations suggest that, for f 1 100
19= - -˜ , this turns out to be true, i.e. the
post-selection-based reduction is applicable (see figure A2). As stated in themain text such rates are unlikely to
be achievable on the physical level, but they are, at least in principle, possible through fault-tolerant
constructions.
Fixed point and convergence—general pairs
In the followingwe show that the previous established results also hold true for the general i.i.d. setting
where L applies all four Pauli operators and each individual pair is arbitrary.We remind the reader that the
recurrence relations for states P Bi j k l ijkl ij AB kl L ijkl E, , , h hå ñ Ä ñ Ä ñ∣ ∣ ∣ (i.e. Eve purifies
P B Bn i j k l ijkl ij ij AB kl kl L, , ,
2r h h= å ñá Ä ñá∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ with the leaked noise transcripts) read (by denoting P pijkl ijkl2 =∣ ∣ ) as
p f p p
i i i j u k l k l
i j k l i i j i k l
, , , , ,
, , ,
i i j k l k l
0 1 0 1
1 2 0 1 1 1
1, 2, 1
1 1 2 2 0 1
1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
å å=d d g g
d d g g
a b a b a b a b a b a b
Å = Å = =
Å Å Å Å Å Å Å Å Å Åa b a b
˜ ˜
( ) ( )
( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
modulo the normalization factor p
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
åd d g g d d g g˜ .
For simplicity we assume independent single qubit white noise, i.e. f f f, , , , ,1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2=a b a b a b a b˜ ˜ ˜ aswell as
f f,1 1 =a b˜ if 01 1a b= = and f1 3-( ) otherwise. Furthermore, we assume that the initial fidelity Fwith B00ñ∣
is sufficiently high for distillation.Numerically iterating the recurrence relations (whichwe again denote by
p p
f ˜ ) reveal that, for a sufficiently large number of iterations, the ‘cross-probabilities’ vanish, i.e.
p i k0ijkl =  ¹¥ or j l¹ . Hence, to obtain afixed point pp ijkl i j k l, , , 01=¥ ¥ =( ) of f , it is reasonable to assume
that p i k0ijkl =  ¹¥ or j l¹ .
Figure A2.The figure illustrates f plog n¢ ¥ ( ) (blue) and g4 log d2 ,n- (yellow) for the binary pairs and f 1 100 19= - -˜ .
16
New J. Phys. 19 (2017) 113012 APirker et al







i i i j u i j i i j i
i j i j
i i j i i i j i
, , , , ,
, ,
i i j
0 1 0 1
1 2 0 1 1 1
1, 2, 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 0 1
1, 1, 2, 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
å å=d d d d
d d d d
a b a b a b a b
a b a b
Å = Å = Å Å =
Å Å Å Å
Å Å Å Å Å Å Å Å
a b a b
˜ ˜
·
( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )
where , 0, 10 1d d Î { }and N p,0 1 0 1 0 1= åd d d d d d . Figure A3 illustrates the numerical estimate of p0000¥ as a function
of f.
Similar to the case of binary pairs, we canwrite the recurrence relations f in terms of its Taylor series
expansion around thefixed point p¥, i.e. p f p f p f p p p .= » + ¢ -¥ ¥ ¥˜ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) Hence by defining
e p p= - ¥wehave e f p e= ¢ ¥˜ ( ) , i.e. as for binary pairs, the error induced by the 1-normof the state of Alice,
Bob, and L after n successful distillation rounds satisfies
p p B B p p f p e .
A.23
n
i j k l
ijkl
n
ijkl ij ij AB kl kl L






, , , 1 , , ,
1
1 1;v å år r h h- = - ñá Ä ñá - ¢¥ ¥ ¥ -    ( )∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
( )
( ) ( )
Figure A4 suggests a linear relationship between the number of successful distillation rounds n and
f plog n 1¢ ¥ - ( ) for each noise level f, i.e. b f n a f f plog n 1+ = ¢ ¥ - ( ) ( ) ( ) . As the numberN of pairs
necessary to achieve n distillation rounds is N 2n= ( n Nlog2 = )we have
b f N a f f plog log n2
1+ = ¢ ¥ - ( ) ( ) ( ) , which is equivalent to
e e a f Nf p .n a f b f N b f1 log2¢ = = ¢¥ - ¢ ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
Hence, f p n 1¢ ¥ - ( ) scales as F N O Nb fÎ ¢( ) ( )( ) where b f 0¢ <( ) and b f¢( ) decays for f 1 .
What is left to show, is that thefixed point p¥ is an attractingfixed point. For that purpose we numerically
compute the largest eigenvalue of f p¢ ¥( ), see figure A5, and observe that, for noise below 10−1, i.e.
f1 10 1- < - , the largest eigenvalue maxl of f p¢ ¥( ) fulfills 1maxl < , proving that p¥ is an attractingfixed point.
This implies that, if the initial fidelity Fwith B00ñ∣ is sufficiently large for distillation, theDEJMPS protocol
necessarily converges towards the fixed point p¥where the ‘cross-probabilities’ vanish.
The analysis so far still lacks Eve’s system E for the leaked noise transcripts. Suppose n ABELy ñ∣ and f ABELy ñ∣
are purifications of nr and fixr , i.e. trn E n nr y y= ñá[∣ ∣]and trE f ffixr y y= ñá[∣ ∣] respectively. This implies
F Nn n n f f 1 y y y y= ñá - ñá ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) , i.e. O Nn b f 2 Î ¢( )( ) whichwe also confirmedwith our numeric
results.
It is straightforward to extend the analysis above to two-qubit correlated noise introduced by L on the system
of Alice and Bob. For that purpose we assume that f f f1 16, , ,1 1 2 2 = + -a b a b˜ ˜ ( ˜) if 01 1 2 2a b a b= = = =
and f1 16-( ˜) otherwise. Also in that case we numerically observe that p i k0ijkl =  ¹¥ or j l¹ . Hence it is
reasonable to assume that p i k0ijkl =  ¹¥ or j l¹ in order to obtain a fixed point pp ijkl i j k l, , , 01=¥ ¥ =( ) of f .
Figure A3.The figure illustrates p0000
¥ as a function of f. The fidelity with B00ñ∣ of the asymptotic state is equal to unity for a perfect
apparatus.
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where , 0, 10 1d d Î { }and N p,0 1 0 1 0 1= åd d d d d d . Figure A6 illustrates the numerical estimate of p0000¥ as a function
of f˜ .
Furthermore we numerically compute the largest eigenvalue of f p¢ ¥( ) and observe that if f 0.8284>˜ , the
largest eigenvalue maxl of f p¢ ¥( ) fulfills 1maxl < , hence p¥ is an attracting fixed point, seefigure A7.
Finally, we obtain again a linear relationship between the number of successful distillation rounds n and
f plog n 1¢ ¥ - ( ) for each noise level f˜ , i.e. b f n a f f plog n2 2 1+ = ¢ ¥ - ( ˜) ( ˜) ( ) , see figure A8. This implies,
similar to the case of single qubit white noise, that the right-hand side of (A.23) converges polynomial fast
towards zero in terms of initial states. The rate of convergence is governed by f˜ , i.e. F Nn fix 1 2r r-  ( )where
F N O Nb f2 2Î( ) ( )( ˜) and b f 02 <( ˜) with b f2( ˜) decays for f 1˜ .
Taking the systemof leaking noise transcripts into account,this implies that
F Nn n n f f 1 2 y y y y= ñá - ñá ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )˜ ˜ , i.e. O Nn b f 22 Î ( )( ˜) .
To conclude the analysis, we now show that the noisemodel of two-qubit depolarizing noise is actually
sufficient to cover anynoise process for two-qubit operations. This is the case because for anyCNOT-type gate
Figure A4.The figure illustrates the value of f plog n¢ ¥ ( ) as a function of successful distillation rounds for single qubit white noise
10−2 (blue), 10−3 (yellow) and 10−4 (green).
Figure A5.The figure shows the largest eigenvalue of f p¢ ¥( ) (y-axis) for single qubit white noise (x-axis).
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(whichwe need to apply in the case of both recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols we consider),
one can depolarize these gates to a standard form [26]. This is done by randomly applying single-qubit
operations before and after the application of the gate, which allows one to reduce any noise characteristics to a
specific formwith 8 parameters without altering the fidelity of the gate. A further simplification is possible if the
noise characteristic of the apparatus is known [26], which could in some cases be achieved through quantum
process tomography. In this case, one can add additional (local)noise by randomly choosing to apply the gate, or
some other (separable) operation. This allows one to bring anyCNOT-type gate (i.e. any two-qubit gate that is






, , , 0
1
, , , ,
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
 år r s s rs s= + -
a b a b





As outlined in [26] this depolarization procedure causes a change in the gatefidelity of the utilized quantum
gates.More precisely, if the fidelity of the quantumgate before the depolarizationwas F x1g = - then the gate
fidelity after the depolarization is F x1 17g¢ > - . Thus one reduces the quality of the gate by about an order of
magnitude in theworst case by depolarizing to this standard form.
Figure A6.The figure illustrates p0000
¥ as a function of f˜ for two qubit correlated noise. The fidelity with B00ñ∣ of the asymptotic state is
equal to unity for a perfect apparatus.
Figure A7.The figure shows the largest eigenvalue of f p¢ ¥( ) (y-axis) for correlated two qubit noise (x-axis).
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where f f f1 160,0,0,0 = + -˜ ˜ ( ˜) and f f1 16, , ,1 1 2 2 = -a b a b˜ ( ˜) otherwise. Recall, that one noisy distillation step
of theDEJMPS protocol including L is given by (A.2). By introducingO U OuD 2 EPP= ¢- we rewrite (A.2) as
Figure A8.The figure illustrates the value of f plog n¢ ¥ ( ) as a function of successful distillation rounds for two qubit correlated noise
10−2 (blue), 10−3 (yellow) and 10−4 (green).
Figure A9.The figure illustrates log n 1 + for the BBPSSWprotocol for different noise parameters f= 0.97 (blue), f= 0.98 (green) and
f= 0.99 (red).
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2år¢ = Ä YñáY Ä YñáY Ä
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b˜ ( )(∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) † †
Weobserve that the noisemapsU Ua a, ,1 1
1
2 2
2Äa b a b( ) ( ) in (A.26) act onAlice’s part of the systems only. But this is
sufficient due to the symmetry of Bell-states—noise onBobs side can bemoved to the other side. Furthermore
the additional xs -flips introduced on the system(s) of L by the unitariesU Ua a, ,1 11 2 22Äa b a b( ) ( ) are used to keep track of
the noisemap applied. Because Alice and Bob apply the depolarization procedure as described in [26] and L
keeps track of the effective error introduced, we can safely assume that the additional xs -flips will be introduced
afterAlice andBob complete the depolarization procedure, hence it is sufficient to consider two qubit correlated
noise introduced at Alice’s part of the systems.
A.2. TheBBPSSWprotocol
The protocol proposed in [28] (also referred to as BBPSSWprotocol) is very similar to theDEJMPS protocol.
Instead of step 1 of protocol 1 Alice and Bob apply a correlated depolarization procedure (twirl) to their input
states which brings them toWerner form.
For the subsequent analysis, suppose that each pair of Alice and Bob is of the form
p p B B p1 id00 00
1
4
r = ñá + -( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) .We assume that the apparatus applies independent and identical noise of
the form N p f p f p p p p1 4 x x y y z zr r r s r s s r s s r s= + - + + +( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) before each distillation











= ++ =˜ ( )
Thefixed point p¥ of the protocol is obtained by solving the equation b p p=¥ ¥( ) . A straightforward
computation gives the fixed point p f f2 3 1 3 4 9 62= + - +¥ (which depends on the noise parameter
f ). It was shown in [27] that this fixed point is an attractor assuming sufficiently high initialfidelity with B00ñ∣ per
input pair. Expressing the recurrence relation b in terms of its Taylor series around p¥ leads to
p b p b p b p p p . A.27= » + ¢ -¥ ¥ ¥˜ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
Hence, (A.27) provides an approximation of the error in terms offidelity with B00ñ∣ after n 1+ successful
distillation rounds, i.e. b pn n1 1 = ¢+ ¥( ( )) , see also the plots offigure A9.Moreover, we compute thefirst
derivative of b by
b p







¢ = + -+( )
( )
( )
Evaluating b¢ at p¥ yields
b p
f
f f f f
9 3




+ + - +
¥( )
( ( ) )
( )
From this we conclude that, if the apparatus is perfect, i.e. f=1 in (A.28), the error in terms offidelity with
B00ñ∣ after n 1+ successful distillation rounds scales as 2 3n n1 1 =+ ( ) .
Using N nlog2 = , whereN denotes the number of initial states, we infer for n 1 + that
b p N2 .n N b p N b p1 1 log 1 log log 1 log2 2 2 2   = ¢ = =+ ¥ ¢ ¢¥ ¥( ) ( )( ) ( )
This implies that n 1 + scales as F N O N b plog2Î ¢ ¥( ) ( )( ) and thus nfix 1r r-  , where fixr and nr denote thefixed
point and the state after n successful distillation rounds respectively, scales also as F N O N b plog2Î ¢ ¥( ) ( )( ) as
mentioned in themain text.
For the analysis of two qubit correlated noise we assume that the noisy operations used by the BBPSSW




tr id , A.2912 12
ideal
12 12r r r= + - Ä˜
˜
[ ] ( )
where ρ is a two qubit density operator andO12
ideal denotes the ideal two qubit quantumgate. Observe that (A.29)
coincides with the standard formof [26]. If the noisy quantum gates are not of the form (A.29)we bring them to
that standard form via the same depolarization procedurementioned in the analysis of theDEJMPS protocol.
Hence the following anaylsis is not restricted to this specific noisemodel, but actually applies to arbitrary noise
processes describing noisy two qubit gates.
It has been shown in [27] that the BBPSSWprotocol converges for noisy CNOTgates of the form (A.29) to a
unique and attracting fixed point if f˜ is sufficiently high. The recurrence relation for thefidelity relative to B00ñ∣
obtained in [27] is given by the formula
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For F F F,min maxÎ ( )we have that F F¢ > which shows that Fmax is an attracting fixed point. By replacing F ¢ in
(A.30)with b F˜( )we observe similar to (A.27) that the error after n 1+ successful distillation rounds scales for
two qubit correlated noise as F N O N b Flog2 maxÎ ¢( ) ( )˜ ( ) whereN denotes the number of initial states.
Finally we provide aworst case analysis of the BBPSSWprotocol. For that purpose assume the following
scenario: the noisy apparatus performswith probability fI the ideal distillation step I and introduces with
probability f1 I- an arbitrary noisemap ^ .More precisely, we decompose the distillation step taken byAlice
and Bob before themeasurement of the target system as theCPmap
f f1 ,I I I  r r r= + - ^( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
where ρ is a four qubit density operator. Notice that one can always decompose a noisymap in this form,where
bothmaps are completely positive and trace preserving.We remark, however, that themap I denotes the ideal
protocol which includes an abort option, i.e. we only keep the first pair if the results of themeasurements on the
second pair coincide. Themap ^ may similarly contain such an abort branch. The noise parameter fI describes
the quality of the overallmap9, i.e. one can think of the process that with probability fI the desired procedure
(including gates andmeasurements) is performed, while with probability f1 I-( ) something else happens
(described by themap ^ ).
Wewill now consider theworst case for themap ^ w.r.t. entanglement distillation. Theworst case for the
BBPSSWprotocol is that the apparatus introduces a state orthogonal to B00ñ∣ on the source system and the state
B00ñ∣ on the target system as this will always contribute to the overall success probability of a distillation step of
the BBPSSWprotocol but lead at the same time to a lowerfidelity relative to B00ñ∣ after themeasurement of the
target system compared to the ideal distillation step.One example for such amap is given by
B B B B01 01 00 00 r = ñá Ä ñá^( ) ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣. Any othermapwill lead to a largerfidelity after the distillation step followed
by depolarization toWerner form.We thus have
F
f F























( ) ( )( )
for thefidelity relative to B00ñ∣ . This formula can be understood as follows: the ideal protocol is appliedwith
probability fI, and succeedswith probability fsuc, thereby producing afidelity F˜ . Themap ^ is appliedwith
probability f1 I-( ), does never abort and does not contribute to the finalfidelity (which is clearly theworst
case).We thus have F f f F f f f1I suc I suc I¢ + -˜ [ ( )].
We now analyze theworst case scenario, i.e. assuming equality in (A.31). Sincewe know that at each step the
actual noisemap produces an output density operatorwith a largerfidelity than theworst-casemap, we can
conclude that the resultingfidelity of any noisemapwill be larger than thefixed point which is achieved by the
worst-casemap.We remark, however, that this does not constitute a full confidentiality proof for arbitrary noise
maps, as it is not evident from this analysis that for any fixed noisemap a uniquefixed point is reached.
Assuming equality in (A.31), one can compute that the fixed points of the noisy BBPSSWprotocol are in this case
given by the solutions of
f f F f F f F9 2 14 8 0 A.32I I I
2
I
3- + - - + =¥ ¥ ¥( ) ( )
which only depend on the noise parameter fI.We define g x f f f x f x f x, 9 2 14 8fix I I I I
2
I
3= - + - - +( ) ( )
which implies that (A.32) reads as g F f, 0fix I =¥( ) . The question howmany solutions of (A.32) are real we easily
answer by the discriminant of gfix.We obtain for the discriminant of gfix





4D = - - - +( ) ( ) ( )
Hence if f 0ID >( ) then all three solutions of (A.32) are real.We numerically estimate that f 0IcritD =( ) for
f 0.9641Icrit » , hence for f fI Icrit> there exist three real solutions of (A.32) because f 0ID >( ) for f fI Icrit> , see
figure A10. Thus, for f fI Icrit> , we compute thefixed points of the noisy BBPSSWprotocol via solving (A.32).
Figure A11 shows the function gfix for different values of fI. Fromfigures A10 andA11we infer that we have
three possiblefixed points for f fI Icrit> . Hencewe need to show that the fixed point with the highest fidelity
9
We remark that a similar analysis can be performed bymodeling local operations of Alice and Bob sepearetely in this way.
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relative to B00ñ∣ obtained via (A.32) is an attractingfixed point.We solve this issue by showing that F F¢ > for
F F F,min maxÎ ( ) (where Fmin denotes the second, and Fmax the third fixed point infigure A11). Fromfigure A12
wefind that F F 0¢ - > for f fI Icrit> , hence F F¢ > which shows that Fmax is an attracting fixed point whenever
startingwith initial fidelity F Fmin> .
Furthermore, by assuming equality in (A.31) and replacing F ¢with b F^( ), we observe similar to (A.27) that
the error after n 1+ successful distillation rounds scales in this worst case analysis as F N O N b Flog2 maxÎ ¢^( ) ( )( )
whereN denotes the number of initial states.
Appendix B. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
In this sectionwe provide the proofs of lemmas 3 and 5 of themain text, crucial for the de-Finetti-based and
post-selection-based reduction techniques. Both proofs require only one specific property of the real protocol
a: after passing the parameter estimation phase the entanglement distillation protocol always converges to one
fixed point, i.e. thefixed point is unique, an attractor for all the states which pass the parameter estimation and
depends on the noise parameters only, as this implies that the distancewith respect to the 1-normwithin the ok-
branch of the protocol is bounded and converges towards zero.
Figure A10.The figure illustrates the discriminant fID( ) of (A.32). For f 0.9641I > wehave f 0ID >( ) .
Figure A11.The figure illustrates the function gfix for f 0.97I = (blue), f 0.98I = (yellow), f 0.99I = (green) and f 1I = (red). The
fixed points of the BBPSSWprotocol correspond to the zero’s of g F f,fix I( ).
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B.1. Proof of lemma3
Wefirst state the following lemmawhich establishes a connection betweenmeasurements on one subsystemof a
bipartite state and tensor product states.
Lemma8 (Steering of local states). Let ABr be a bipartite (in general, mixed) state and let trA B ABr r= [ ]and







r f f rf=
ñá Äf [(∣ ∣ ) ]
( )
where Afñ Î∣ and p trA Af f f r= ñá( ) (∣ ∣ ). If B B 1 r r-f  for all Afñ Î∣ , then
C2 , B.1AB A B 1 r r r- Ä  ( )
where C only depends on the dimensions of A and B. In particular, if we fix the number of qubits of A and B to 2
respectively, thenwe have C 48= .
Proof. In the followingwe denote the four Pauli operators by
id, , , .x z y0 1 2 3s s s s s s s= = = =
First we decompose ABr in the Pauli basis, i.e. we have
1
2




år a s s= Ä+ ( )
where n andm denote the number of qubits ofA andB respectively andwe use the notations i ii , .., n1= ( ) and
j jj , .., m1= ( )where each ik and jk are in 0, .., 3{ }as well as kn ii 1 ks s= =⨂ and km jj 1 ks s= =⨂ . Recall that
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r r r a a a s s a a a s s
a a a a a a
- Ä - Ä = - Ä




     
 
( ) ∣ ∣ ·
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
where a , ..,00 3 3n ma a= ( ), a , ..,00 00 3 0 03n ma a a a¢ = ( ) and 1; n m4 + · denotes the 1-normof vectors in 4n m + .
Hence in order to prove (B.1) it is sufficient to prove Ca a 21; n m4 - ¢ +  . By assumptionwe have for Brf
where Afñ Î∣ and p ItrA ABf f f r= ñá Ä( ) ((∣ ∣ ) ) that B B 1 r r-f  for all Afñ Î∣ .Moreover,
Figure A12.The figure illustrates F F¢ - for f 0.97I = (blue), f 0.98I = (yellow), f 0.99I = (green) and f 1I = (red).
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where pB x f( ∣ ) denotes the conditional probability of obtaining the outcomef on systemA and the outcome ξ
on systemB and Em{ }denotes a POVMon the subsystemofB. Supposewe perform a projectivemeasurement
on the systems ofA andB denoted by k AB k A k By f xñ = ñ Ä ñ{∣ } {∣ ∣ }where k 1, .., 4n mÎ +{ }on ABr and A Br rÄ .
This yields for the respective probabilities pAB ky( ) and qAB ky( ) of observing outcome k for ABr and A Br rÄ
p I
p p p p
q q q
tr tr tr tr
tr tr ,
tr tr tr
AB k k k AB k k A k k B AB k k B A k k A AB
k k B A k B A k k k B B A k B k k
AB k k k A B k k A k k B A k B k
k k
y y y r f f x x r x x f f r
x x f r f x x r f x f
y y y r r f f r x x r f x
= ñá = ñá Ä ñá = ñá ñá Ä
= ñá = ñá =
= ñá Ä = ñá ñá =
f f
( ) (∣ ∣ ) (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) (∣ ∣ [(∣ ∣ ) ])
(∣ ∣ ( ) ) ( ) (∣ ∣ ) ( ) ( ∣ )
( ) (∣ ∣ ) (∣ ∣ ) (∣ ∣ ) ( ) ( )
where pB k kx f( ∣ ) denotes the conditional probability of obtaining outcome kf on systemAfirst and obtaining
outcome kx on systemB.We observe p qA k A kf f=( ) ( ). Thuswe obtain
p q p p q p2AB k AB k A k B k k B k A ky y f x f x f- = -∣ ( ) ( )∣ ( )∣ ( ∣ ) ( )∣ ( )
using (B.6). In order to compute a bound for (B.5)we use quantum state tomography, see e.g. [33]. For that
purposewe perform an informationally complete POVM induced by different separable bases on A B Ä .
More precisely, we choose thatmany POVMs such that we have in total 4n m+ different outcomes.We observe
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and p pp , ..,AB AB1 4n my y= +( ( ) ( )) and q qq , ..,AB AB1 4n my y= +( ( ) ( )) as





2n m n m
= = ¢+ +
respectively. Hence Tp q a a2n m - = - ¢+ ( ) ( ).Moreover we observe thatT is invertible if the POVM is
informationally complete, see [33] for details. Thus, invertingT and taking norms on both sides yields
T T p q
T p T
a a p q2 2
2 2 2 4 2 ,
n m n m
k


















- ¢ - = -+ - + -
+ - - + +
+ +      
   
∣ ( ) ( )∣
( )
which completes the proof for the general case with C T 4 2n m n m1= - + +  .
Before we complete the lemmaweneed to determineC for the case of n m 2= = .We choose
j j j j j j j j4 1 4 1 4 13 1
2
2 3 4 1 2 4 4
f f f f fñ = ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ- + - + - +∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣( ) ( ) ( ) where j j j j, , , 1, 2, 3, 41 2 3 4 Î { }and
0 1 2 , B.121f¢ñ = ñ + ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
25
New J. Phys. 19 (2017) 113012 APirker et al
i0 1 2 , B.132f¢ñ = ñ + ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
0 , B.143f¢ñ = ñ∣ ∣ ( )
0 1 2 , B.154f¢ñ = ñ - ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
which is informationally complete and thus a valid choice. This choice of lf¢ñ∣ corresponds to a Pauli tomography
on a single qubit.We observe that thematrixT is invertible and compute T 161 =-  . Thus C 48= which
completes the proof. ,
Roughly speaking lemma 8 states that if all post-selected reduced states of a bipartite state, where each
partition consists of two qubits, are η-close then the overall state is 2 48h· close to a product state.
We gave the lemma in amore general form as itmay have utility beyond the scope of this paper. However for
our purposes we need a stronger, butmore specific result. In the following lemmawewill show thatwe can
achieve the same result even if themeasurementsmust succeed above a threshold, which is important in the
application of the lemma.
Lemma9. In the situation of lemma 8 for n m 2= = it suffice to considermeasurements on the subsystem Awhich
have a probability greater than or equal to 1/16.
More precisely, for every state ABr there exists a unitaryU acting on system A and a state
U I U IAB B AB Br r¢ = Ä Ä( ) ( )†, such that if the state ABr¢ meets the conditions of lemma 8, i.e. subsystem B is ò-non-
steerable viameasurements on subsystem A for all measurements with probability greater than or equal to 1/16, then
C2 . B.16AB A B 1 r r r- Ä  ( )
Proof. First we construct the state ABr¢ associatedwith ABr and show that it suffice to considermeasurements of
probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Recall the situation of lemma 8. Let ABr be a bipartite (in general,







r f f rf=
ñá Äf [(∣ ∣ ) ]
( )
where Afñ Î∣ and p trA Af f f r= ñá( ) (∣ ∣ ). Then the claim of lemma 8was: if B B 1 r r-f  for all
Afñ Î∣ , then
C2 B.17AB A B 1 r r r- Ä  ( )
whereC only depends on the dimensions ofA andB. In particular, if we fix the number of qubits ofA andB to 2
respectively, thenwe have C 48= .
Further recall that the set j j j j j j j j4 1 4 1 4 13 1 2 2 3 4 1 2 4 4
f f f f fñ = ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ Ä ¢ ñ- + - + - +∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣( ) ( ) ( ) where
j j j j, , , 1, 2, 3, 41 2 3 4 Î { }of lemma 8, i.e. (B.12)–(B.15), is informationally complete and thus suffice to
reconstruct any 4 qubit quantum state where
0 1 2 , B.181f¢ñ = ñ + ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
i0 1 2 , B.192f¢ñ = ñ + ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
0 , B.203f¢ñ = ñ∣ ∣ ( )
0 1 2 . B.214f¢ñ = ñ - ñ∣ (∣ ∣ ) ( )
In order to prove the claim, we use the following observation: the state trA B ABr r= [ ] is a two qubit quantum







∣ ∣ ( )
where the states jYñ∣ correspond to the (orthogonal) eigenstates of Ar for the real non-negative eigenvalues jl .
Hence there exists at least one j 0, 1, 2, 3¢ Î { } such that 1 4j l ¢ , which corresponds to themaximumof the
eigenvalues jl . Nowwe choose a local unitaryU such thatU 0 0jY ñ = ñ Ä ñ¢∣ ∣ ∣ . Applying this unitary to (B.22)
therefore leads to the state
U U 00 00 , B.23A
j













⎟⎟∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )†
where Uj jj yñ = ñ∣ ∣ .We compute the probability for any projector applied on Ar¢ which is taken from the set
(B.18)–(B.21) and of the form k k l lf f f f f f¢ñá ¢ = ¢ñá ¢ Ä ¢ñá ¢∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣by
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†
wherewe have used that AB BAtr tr=( ) ( ) formatricesA andB and that tr 0 0 1 2k k f f¢ ñá ¢ ñá(∣ ∣∣ ∣) for
all k 0, 1, 2, 3Î { }.
Sowe define the state ABr¢ as U I U IAB B AB Br r¢ = Ä Ä( ) ( )†. Observe that the probabilities of all projectors
within the tomographic set (B.18)–(B.21) are greater than or equal to 1/16 for the state Ar¢ .
Now supposewe perform ameasurement from the tomographic set (B.18)–(B.21) on the subsystemA of







r f f rf¢ =
ñá Ä ¢f [(∣ ∣ ) ]
( )
where p 1 16A f( ) . Furthermore assume as in lemma 8 that B B 1 r r¢ -f  for all such Afñ Î∣ . Then
lemma 8 implies that
C2 . B.25AB A B 1 r r r¢ - ¢ Ä  ( )
The proof completes by observing that ABr¢ and A Br r¢ Ä are related by the local unitaryU to ABr and A Br rÄ
and the unitary equivalence of the trace distance, i.e.
U I U I B.26AB A B B AB A B B1 1r r r r r r- Ä = Ä - Ä Ä   ( )( )( ) ( )†
C2 . B.27AB A B 1 r r r= ¢ - ¢ Ä  ( )
,
Weobserve that, due to the proof of lemma 9, which relies on the informationally complete set (B.18)–
(B.21), it suffices to be non-steerable with respect to themeasurements within that set for a probability of
measurement above or equal to 1/16.We actually have proven a stronger result, as the actual choice of
measurements does notmatter, provided the probability of success is above or equal to the threshold 1/16.
Lemma (Lemma3 inmain text—product form lemma). Let r be an arbitrarymixed state shared by Alice and
Bob and let ABEyñ∣ be a purification thereof held by Eve. Furthermore, let 1 correspond to a (distillation-type) real
protocol and 2 correspond to the associated (distillation-type) ideal protocol, i.e.
p p
p p
ok ok 1 fail fail ,









= Ä ñá + - Ä ñá







( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
whereα characterizes the level of the noise, ABsa , and ABs^ are two fixed two qubit states. Furthermore, let 1 and 2
satisfy the following properties:
(1) The noise transcripts do not leak to Eve.
(2) The protocol 1 guarantees to converge towards some state ABsa within the ok-branch of the protocol
andmax AB1 2 1AB   m e-m  ( )( ) .
Then it holds that
id id 34 4 1 . B.28E E ABE1 2 1 8  y y eÄ - Ä ñá + ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( · ) ( )
Proof.The proof relies on lemmas 8 and 9. Suppose Eve prepares the pure state ABEyñ∣ and let
trE ABy y rñá =[∣ ∣] be the state received byAlice and Bob. Thenwe have
p p
p p
id ok ok 1 fail fail ,
id ok ok 1 fail fail .
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E ABE AB E





y y s s s
y y s s s s
Ä ñá = Ä ñá + - Ä Ä ñá







( )(∣ ∣) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( )(∣ ∣) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( )
If we post-select equation (B.29) on the ok-branchwe have after normalization
p
1
id ok ok id ok ok . B.30ABE E ABE1 y y sÄ ñá Ä ñá = Ä ñá
r
( ∣ ∣)( )(∣ ∣) ∣ ∣ ( )
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It is obvious from the fact that the protocol is performed byAlice and Bob per definition that anymeasurement
of Eve in the ok-branch can be commuted to the beginning of the protocol 1 because Eve is not part of the
protocol. Hence hermeasurement only changes the input of the protocol 1 and thus either cause an abort
or not.
We call thefinal state of Alice and Bob η-Eve-non steerable if for all Ef Î wehave AB AB 1 s s h-f 
where tr idAB E p AB E ABE
1
E




⎦⎥( ∣ ∣ )( ) .We sketch the remainder of this proof as follows: we show, that
thefinal state of Alice and Bob is Eve-non steerable in the sense of lemma 8 bymaking use of the bounded
distance of the protocols 1 and 2 . Furthermore, lemma 9 implies that it suffice to considermeasurements of
Eve of having probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Therefore lemmas 8 and 9 completes the proof.
Because the output of Alice and Bob are 2 qubits the purifying system that Eve holds is without loss of
generality also a two-qubit system.Hence, according to lemma 9, there exists a state ABEs¢ , which is unitarly
related to ABEs via an unitaryU onEve’s systemonly (which is not part of the protocol) and forwhich it suffice to
considermeasurements of Eve having probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Furthermore observe that this
local unitary of Eve can not change the success probability of the overall protocol as unitaries are CPTP. In other
words, the success probabilities associatedwith ABEs and ABEs¢ are identical.
More formally, suppose Eve performs a projectivemeasurement on this state ABEs¢ (which stems from a
purification ABEy¢ñ∣ of ABr¢ which is unitarly related to the purification ABEyñ∣ of ABr and both having the same
success probability, see paragraph above) and observes outcome Efñ Î∣ having probability greater than or
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More importantly, we relate the probability of the protocol succeeding for initial state r¢, pr, and the probability
ofmeasuringf after the protocol, pE f( ), to the probability of the protocol succeeding for the initial state ABErf
(measurement of Eve commuted to the beginning of the protocol), prf, and the probability ofmeasuringf
before the protocol has started, pE f¢ ( ), via
p p p p . B.31E Ef f= ¢r rf( ) ( ) ( )













Wenote that the state ABEsf is in the ok-branch of the protocol 1 . The next step is to apply lemma 8which
relates the distances ABE AB E 1s s s¢ - Ä ¢  and AB AB 1s s¢ - f  . In particular we show that for allmeasurements
of Evewith outcome Efñ Î∣ having a probability greater than or equal to 1/16we have that
p17AB AB 1 s s e¢ - f r  . This then implies using lemma 9 that C p34ABE AB E 1 s s s e- Ä r  . In detail,
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Nowwe employ (B.32) in (B.33)which yields
p
p
p p p p p
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( )
because p 1 16E f( ) andmax AB1 2 1AB   m-m  ( )( ) is bounded by ε by assumption.Hencewe apply lemma 8
to ABEs¢ with p
17 e=
r
which implies for the distance between ABEs¢ and AB Es sÄ ¢ that
p
34 4
, B.35ABE AB E 1
8
s s s e¢ - Ä ¢
r
  · ( )
where the factor 48 is the constantC of lemma 8 depending on the dimensions of the systems of Alice/Bob and
Eve, for whichwe have n m 2= = . Furthermore, this implies via lemma 9 that
p
34 4
B.36ABE AB E 1
8
s s s e- Ä
r
  · ( )
because ABEs and AB Es sÄ are unitarly related to ABEs¢ and AB Es sÄ ¢ via the unitaryU onEve’s system. Finally,
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B.2. Proof of lemma5
Nowwe turn to the proof of lemma 5 of themain text. For that purpose we remind the reader that thefinal state
after the distillation protocol including the systemof L is pure. Thus, the following lemmawill turn out to be very
useful.
Lemma10. Let ABr and AB A Bj j j m= ñá Ä∣ ∣ be twomixed states. Furthermore, assume that trA B ABr r= [ ]
satisfies A A 1 r j j e- ñá ∣ ∣ and trB A AB Br r m= =[ ] . Then 4AB AB 1 r j e-  .
Proof.By assumptionwe have A A 1 r j j e- ñá ∣ ∣ .Moreover, let ABRyñ∣ be a purification of ABr . According
to lemmaA.2.7 in [9] there exists a purification A BRj xñ Ä ñ∣ ∣ of ABj such that
ABR A BR A Avec 1y j x r j j eñ - ñ Ä ñ - ñá =   ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ where vecy y yñ = á ñ ∣ ∣ and ABR A BRy j xá ñ ñ∣ ∣ is
real and non-negative.Moreover, lemmaA.2.3 of [9] gives
2 2 .ABR A BR ABR A BR1 vec  y y j j x x y j xñá - ñá Ä ñá ñ - ñ Ä ñ   ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
Wedefine trB R BRx x x= ñá[∣ ∣ ]. As the 1-normdoes not increase under the partial trace we have
2B B AB A B ABR A BR1 1 1   r x r j j x y y j j x x- - ñá Ä ñá - ñá Ä ñá     ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
by construction.Moreover, the assumption B Br m= implies 2B B B B1 1 m x r x e- = -    . This gives us
2A B A B B B1 1 j j m j j x m x eñá Ä - ñá Ä = -   ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ . If we combine these results we obtain
4 ,
AB AB AB A B AB





r j r j j m r
j j x j j x j j m e
- = - ñá Ä
- ñá Ä + ñá Ä - ñá Ä
    
  
∣ ∣
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
which proves the claim. ,
Lemma 10 enables us to prove lemma 5 of themain text.
Lemma (Lemma5 of themain text). Let  be the real protocol which guarantees to converge towards a unique and
attracting fixed point depending on the noise parameter only. Let  be the ideal protocol as defined in themain text.
Furthermore let ρ be amixed state (consisting of n systems) shared by Alice and Bob. If the extension of  and  to the
system of L satisfies nL L 1  r r e- ( ) ( ) ( ), then
nid id 4E ABE E ABE 1  y y y y eÄ ñá - Ä ñá¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )
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for all purifications ABEyñ ¢∣ of ρ.
Proof.Asmentioned in themain text, we introduce a two-level flag systemheld byAlice which indicates whether
they aborted the protocol or not. Sowe observe
p p
p p
ok ok 1 fail fail ,








r y y s
= Ä ñá + - Ä ñá





( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( ) ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
where E denotes the systemof leaked noise transcripts to Eve. By assumptionwe have nL L 1  r r e- ( ) ( ) ( ).
This is equivalent to p nABEL f f ABEL 1 s y y e- ñár ∣ ∣ ( ) since L r( ) and L r( ) are equal on the fail branch. This
we can rewrite to n pABEL f f ABEL 1 s y y e- ñá r ∣ ∣ ( ) .
Moreover, applying the real and ideal protocol to the purification ABEyñ ¢∣ results in
p p
p p
id ok ok 1 fail fail ,
id ok ok 1 fail fail .






y y s s
y y s r s
Ä ñá = Ä ñá + - Ä ñá
Ä ñá = Ä Ä ñá + - Ä ñá
r r
r r
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
^
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
^
( )(∣ ∣ ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( )(∣ ∣ ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
Again, both expression are equal in the fail branch, thus the 1-norm simplifies to
pid id . B.37E ABE E ABE ABEE ABE
f
E1 1 y y y y s s rÄ ñá - Ä ñá = - Är¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢   ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )
Hence it is sufficient to show p n4ABEE ABE
f
E 1 s s r e- Är ¢ ¢  ( ) .We observe that by introducing the system
L held by L that
p p . B.38ABEE ABE
f
E ABELE ABEL E1 1s s r s y y r- Ä - ñá Är r a a¢ ¢ ¢ ¢   ∣ ∣ ( )
One easily verifies trE ABELE ABELs s=¢ ¢[ ] and trABEL ABELE Es r=¢ ¢[ ] because the system E¢ is not changed by the
protocol  .Moreover, by assumptionwe have n pABEL f f ABEL 1 s y y e- ñá r ∣ ∣ ( ) . Thuswe apply lemma 10
to A B ABELEr s¢ ¢ ¢≔ and A B f f ABEL Ej y y r= ñá Ä¢ ¢ ¢∣ ∣ where A ABEL¢ ≔ and B E¢ ¢≔ which implies
n p4 . B.39ABELE f f ABEL E 1 s y y r e- ñá Ä r¢ ¢ ∣ ∣ ( ) ( )
Employing (B.38) and (B.39) in (B.37) yields
p n p p n nid id 4 4 4E ABE E ABE 1   y y y y e e eÄ ñá - Ä ñá =r r r¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( ) ( ) ( )
which completes the proof. ,
AppendixC. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols whenever the noise
transcripts leak
In this sectionwe showhow the confidentiality guarantees regarding an entanglement distillation protocol can
be extended to the case whenever the noise transcripts leak to Eve.
We remind the reader that it is not necessary to leak the noise transcripts to Eve after every single distillation
round. It is sufficient to copy all noise transcripts at the very end to Eve’s register, as L is not accessible and Eve is
not part of the protocol being executed byAlice and Bob.
Theorem (Theorem7 inmain text). Let  be the real protocol and  be the ideal protocol. Furthermore, let l be
the real and l be the ideal protocol when the noise transcripts leak to Eve. Then
nid idE ABE E ABE 1  y y y y eÄ ñá - Ä ñá ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )
implies that
nid id 2 C.1l E ABE l E ABE 1  y y y y eÄ ñá - Ä ñá ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( )(∣ ∣ ) ( ) ( )




id ok ok 1 fail fail ,
id ok ok 1 fail fail .
E ABE AB E
E AB E AB E
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
y y s s s
y y s s s s
Ä ñá = Ä ñá + - Ä Ä ñá







( )(∣ ∣) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
( )(∣ ∣) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
So by assumptionwe have
p nid id ,E E ABE AB E  y y y y s s s eÄ ñá - Ä ñá = - Är a   ( )(∣ ∣) ( )(∣ ∣) ( )
i.e. n pABE AB E s s s e- Äa r  ( ) .
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As outlined in themain text wemodel L in terms of purifications. Because purifications are unitarly
equivalent we choose a particular purification of AB Es sÄa . Thuswe fix ABL L E ABL L E1 2 1 2y y yñ = ¢ñ Ä ñ∣ ∣ ∣
where B ijABL i j ij ij AB L,1 1y w a¢ñ = å ñ ñ∣ ( )∣ ∣ . The purifying systems L1 and L2 we attribute to the LabDemon.
Moreover, according to lemmaA.2.7 in [9] there exists a purification y ñ∣ of ABEs such that
n pABL L E ABL L E vec1 2 1 2  y y eñ - ñ r ∣ ∣ ( ) where vecy y yñ = á ñ ∣ ∣ and ABL L E ABL L E1 2 1 2 y yá ñ∣ is real and
non-negative. Furthermore, lemmaA.2.3 of [9] gives
n p2 2 . C.2ABL L E ABL L E ABL L E ABL L E1 vec1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2      y y y y y y eñá - ñá ñ - ñ r   ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( ) ( )
When the noise transcripts leak to Eve, L effectively copies the noise transcripts ij L1ñ∣ to Eve, resulting in the pure
state B ij ij .ABL L EE i j ij AB L E L E,1 2 1 2f yñ = å ñ ñ ñ Ä ñ¢ ¢∣ ( ∣ ∣ ∣ ) ∣ Hencewe canmodel the leakage of the noise transcripts to
Eve by a unitaryUM such thatU 0M ABL L E E ABL L EE1 2 1 2y fñ ñ = ñ¢ ¢∣ ∣ ∣ . For the protocol when the noise transcripts
leak to Evewe have
p p
p U U p
p p
p U U p
id ok ok 1 fail fail
tr ok ok 1 fail fail
id ok ok 1 fail fail
tr ok ok 1 fail fail .
l
E ABE AB E
L L M M AB E
l
E ABE AB E
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[ ∣ ∣ ] ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ∣
†
†
Because the real and the ideal protocol are equal in the fail-branchwe obtain by using (C.2)
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which proves (C.1). ,
Thus the confidentiality of a protocol where the noise transcripts leak to Eve is bounded by the
confidentiality of the same protocol when they do not.
AppendixD.Quantumone-time padding after the real protocol
In this sectionwe show that afinal secret twirl applied to the pair of Alice and Bob decouples Eve completely
from the remaining state. Keep inmind that for this Alice and Bob require two classical bits unknown to Eve.
Recall that the state of Alice, Bob, Eve, and L after n distillation rounds is pure and of the form
P Bi j k l ijkl ij AB kl L ijkl E, , ,y h hñ = å ñ ñ ñ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ . Tracing over L yields themixed state
P P B B . D.1ABE
i i j j k l
i j kl i j kl i j i j i j kl i j kl
, , , ,1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
*å år h h= ñá Ä ñá∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
Suppose Alice and Bob apply a secret twirl  to (D.1), i.e. they apply stochastically the family of operators
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ñ= - ñ
∣ ( ) ∣
∣ ( ) ∣
Hence, applying the secret twirl  to (D.1) gives
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Note that in the resulting state B B Pi j i j i j k l i j kl i j kl i j kl, ,
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
h hå ñá Ä å ñá∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ Eve decouples, i.e. Alice/Bob and
Eve have a separable state. The obtained resource state can be used to establish a confidential quantum channel
bymeans of quantum teleportation.
Appendix E. Robustness of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol
To complete the security characterization of entanglement distillation protocols we also consider the robustness
of an entanglement distillation protocol. To define this termprecisely wefirst need the definition of a honest
eavesdropper.
Definition 11.Wecall an eavesdropper honest, if the states sent by the eavesdropper are of the form B00 2
nñÄ∣ .
It is obvious that a honest eavesdropper is not entangledwith the ensemble delivered toAlice and Bob via the
noisy quantum channel.Moreover we formally define the robustness of a protocol by:
Definition 12 (Robustness of a protocol).Wecall a protocol a Re -robust, if for a honest eavesdropper the
probability of aborting the protocol is atmost Re .
Nowwe show thatwe can tune the robustness of a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol to be
exponentially small in terms of necessary number of input pairs.
Theorem13. Let M Î such that Alice and Bob achieve e-confidentiality by succeeding M rounds of a recurrence-
type entanglement distillation protocol. Furthermore assume that Alice and Bob receive n pairs from a honest
eavesdropper over the quantum channel nFÄ where 1 4 i j i j i j, , ,r br b s rsF = + - å( ( ) ( ) ( )) such that, after the
parameter estimation step of the proposed protocol, k k- pairs (where k k c2M- = and c 2M 2x= + ) are left
for entanglement distillation. Then, the robustness Re of the protocol is bounded by
F k Mexp 3 4 1 128 exp .R min 2e b a x- - - + -( ( ( ) ) ) ( )
Proof.The basic idea of the proof is to request sufficientlymany pairs fromEve such that the probabilities of
abort during the protocol to be exponentially small while still having enough pairs left to achieveM rounds of a
recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol.We divide the proof into two parts:
• Part 1:We prove that the probability of aborting the recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol due to
parameter estimation is exponentially small.
• Part 2:We prove the same holds true for aborting the protocol during entanglement distillation.
Part 1: Suppose Eve sends the state B n00ñÄ∣ through the noisy quantum channel nFÄ to Alice and Bob. Applying
Φ to B B00 00ñá∣ ∣ yields
B B B B B B B B B B3 1 4 1 4 . E.1AB 00 00 00 00 10 10 01 01 11 11r b b= F ñá = + ñá + - ñá + ñá + ñá(∣ ∣ ) ( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) ( )
Thus the state Alice and Bob receive is .AB
nrÄ According to the preceding protocols proposed in themain text,
Alice and Bob apply a symmetrization to AB
nrÄ , and, depending on the noise level of the apparatus, theymight
have to trace out n k- pairs or not. For the subsequent analysis we assume that this tracing out step is necessary,
i.e. the de-Finetti-based reduction needs to be applied. Hence, Alice and Bob continue by applying a twirl to each
remaining pair. Since AB
krÄ is invariant under permutations and ABr is Bell-diagonal, the remaing state after
twirling is equal to AB
krÄ .
Next, they apply to k of the remaining k pairs the parameter estimation for estimating the fidelity of each
pair. Necessary for convergence of all recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols is that the fidelity F of
ABr with B00ñ∣ satisfies F Fmin a> ( ). Hence this step is crucial in order to guarantee successful distillation.
For that purpose, wemeasure k⌊ ⌋of k pairs by applying two-qubitmeasurements. To bemore precise, we
apply a x xs sÄ to thefirst and z zs sÄ measurement to the second pair.We refer to thismeasurements byM1
andM2 respectively.We observe that the state B00ñ∣ is a common eigenstate ofM1 andM2 with eigenvalue 1.We
define to each pair of pairs a randomvariableXi for i k1, .., 2Î { ⌊ ⌋ }withXi= 1whenever both
measurementsM1 andM2 yield outcome 1 andXi= 0 else.
Furthermore we assume for the expected value X( ) of thefidelity with B00ñ∣ that X Fmin a d= +( ) ( ) ,
where 0d > will befixed below. The protocol will be aborted if the estimate is below Fmin a d+( ) .
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From (E.1)we observe that, whenever F3 1 4 minb a+( ) ( ), the entanglement distillation protocol will
not distill any entanglement. This implies for the quantum channelΦ that, if F4 1 3minb a -( ( ) ) the
parameter estimation stepwill abort, independent of the input provided by Eve. Thuswe assume for the
subsequent analysis that F4 1 3minb a> -( ( ) ) .
Moreover we define 2h d= . Hencewe get by theHoeffdings inequality [34] for the probability of an error
larger than η in ourmeasured estimate X for thefidelity the following expression:
X X k pexp 2 .2 pe abort   h h- -(∣ ( ) ∣ ) ( ) ≕ ‐
Thus the probability of aborting the protocol due to an error in the parameter estimation is exponentially small
in number of necessary input pairs. In order tofix δwe recognize that Alice and Bob abort the protocol whenever
F3 1 4 minb a d+ < +( ) ( ) . This is equivalent to F3 4 1 4mind b a> - -( ( ) ) . Inserting the definition of η
yields F3 4 1 8minh b a> - -( ( ) ) and thus p F kexp 3 4 1 128pe abort min 2b a< - - -( ( ( ) ) )‐ .
Part 2:What remains to be shown is that the probability of aborting the protocol in the distillation phase is
also exponentially small in the number of input pairs. For that purpose, we assume that the noise levelα of the
apparatus is such that distillation is feasible. In the followingwe show that we can force the probability of abort
due to entanglement distillation to be exponentially small in terms of requested input pairs.
We assume that Alice and Bob are left with c2M pairs after parameter estimation. Recall that the Chernoff
inequality for a sequence of independent Bernoulli randomvariables X X, , n1¼ where X p1i = =( ) and
















Moreover, we observe that a basic distillation step can bemodeled by a Bernoulli randomvariableXiwhere
X p1i = =( ) is the probability of succeeding (measurement outcomes coincide).
Supposewe performm rounds of entanglement distillation. LetNm denote the number of input pairs to the
mth round and let d 0, 1Î [ ]. Then theChernoff inequality implies that the probability that less than
d pN1 m-( ) basic distillation steps at roundmhave succeeded is bounded by pNexp d m2
2-( ), i.e.














⎠⎟( ) ( )
But this also implies that, with probability p1 mabort,- , at least d pN1 1m- +( ) basic distillation steps have
succeeded at roundm. Thuswemay safely assume that N d pN1 1m m1 = - ++ ( ) . The situation is summarized
infigure E1. Furthermorewe have N c2M1 = . Eliminating the recurrence relation yields
N d p c d p1 2 1m m m M i
m i i
1 0
1= - + å -+ =-( ) ( ) . This implies for (E.2)
p
d







































⎠⎟( ) ( ) ( )
Furthermore, we compute the probability of aborting the protocol at distillation roundm (assuming that the
previous rounds m1, .., 1- succeeded) by
Figure E1.M rounds of entanglement distillation.
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The events of aborting the distillation protocol at two different rounds i and j are disjoint. Thuswe have for the
probability of aborting in any ofm rounds p pm k
m
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wherewe have used (E.3). Inserting p 1 2= and d 1 2= in (E.4) yields
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By assumptionwe have c 2M 2x= + which implies for (E.5)
p M Mexp 2 2 exp .M
M M
abort in any of rounds
2 2 x x- = -+ - +( ) ( )( )
Thus, the probability of aborting the protocol satisfies
p p p F k M1 exp 3 4 1 128 expR pe abort pe abort abort in any of Mrounds min
2 e b a x+ - - - - + -( ) ( ( ( ) ) ) ( )‐ ‐
which completes the proof. ,
Appendix F. Establishing a confidential quantum channel
For illustration purposes, we showhow confidential quantum channels can be realized using our proposal in
conjunctionwith standard teleportation. By our results, the joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve after the distillation
protocol is ò close to the output of the ideal protocol. The latter, since the register of L is not accessible to any of
the parties and thus is traced out, yields the state of the form (provided the protocol was not aborted)
B B . F.1
i j
ij ij ij AB ij ij Efinal
,
2år w a h h= ñá Ä ñá∣ ( )∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )














2å w a s s rs s h hÄ ñá∣ ( )∣ ∣ ∣ ( )
Thus the only information Eve can obtain is what noise operator was applied on the teleported state, and nothing
more—thus, the channel is confidential.Moreover, the probabilities for the different noise processes are not
under Eve’s control, but depend on the local devices.
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